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ABSTRACT 
Motivational Interviewing (MI) has been shown to be an effecti ve treatment for 
substance abuse and other lifestyle and/or behavioural problems. However, mechanisms of 
change remain a topic of speculation. It has been hypothesised that MI works by eliciting and 
resolving a client's ambivalence, thereby enhancing their motivation and commitment to 
change. Research has supported the theory that enhancing commitment is an integral element 
of MI, however little is known about the role ambivalence plays in producing change. The aim 
of this project was to investigate this role, and the possible role of other relevant models from 
social psychology such as cognitive dissonance. 
First, the social psychology literature relating to the process of ambivalence and 
dissonance was reviewed to determine whether this was adequately reflected in the literature on 
MI. It was found that a comprehensive, contemporary view of these processes is largely absent 
from the literature on MI, and that this may be potentially valuable in furthering an 
understanding of the mechanisms of change. 
Second, a secondary analysis of data from a completed randomized controlled study 
(the United Kingdom Alcohol Treatment Trial - UKATT) on the effectiveness of Motivational 
Enhancement Therapy (MET), an adaptation of MI, was carried out. This used a thematic 
analysis with an a priori coding frame based upon constructs shown previously by research in 
social psychology to be important in ambivalence and dissonance. The aim was to explore the 
relevance of these constructs to understanding the processes within sessions of MI, and to 
determine whether either the model of ambivalence or cognitive dissonance offers an advantage 
in analysing the data. 
Application of the a priori coding frame developed, to MET transcripts revealed 
variations in the expression of ambivalence and cognitive dissonance in client language. 
Inconsistencies both within and between the different cognitive components outlined in both 
theories occurred in close proximity to one another, inferring an experience of inconsistent-
related discomfort within the client. The thematic analysis also enabled the identification of 
additional themes, relevant to both ambivalence and cognitive dissonance theories, in client 
language. In total fourteen themes were identified, five ambivalence and nine cognitive 
dissonance. Ambivalence themes were expressed on 107 occasions and cognitive dissonance on 
205. 
Ambivalence and cognitive dissonance theories prove to be valuable in examining and 
interpreting client language, providing a discrepancy-related model to enhance understanding of 
Mrs motivational processes. It is concluded that cognitive dissonance more adequately captures 
the motivational processes reflected in client language: however ambivalence theory provides a 
more specific model, guiding clinicians and researchers delivering and investigating the 
elicitation and resolve of the ambivalent experience. 
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CHAPTER 1: MOTIVATIONAL INTERVIEWING: EFFECTIVENESS A~D 
THERAPEUTIC PROCESSES 
Overview 
This chapter critically evaluates the empirical literature on Motivational Interviewing 
(MI) in the context of substance abuse. It briefly outlines the various treatments for substance 
abuse and describes the background, style and principles of MI. A review of the research 
investigating the efficacy and effectiveness of MI is provided. Primarily, this chapter presents 
an overview of literature which has explored the active ingredients of Ml. Theories from 
social psychology identified to enhance the understanding of MI's therapeutic processes are 
outlined. The chapter will conclude by identifying some of the gaps in the Militerature and 
defining the aims and research questions of this project. 
For this review a database literature search (PsycINFO) was conducted using 
motivational interviewing as a key phrase. The MI website and online bibliography was also 
used to identify literature (http://www .motivationalinterview .org/library/biblio.htrnl). Key 
papers were manually searched for relevant references. 
Alcohol Problems and Treatment 
Disorders of addiction such as alcohol abuse are one of the most prevalent 
psychological and behavioural disorders (Global Burden of Disease and Injury Series 
[GBDIS], 1996). Alcohol abuse is very common, with a global point prevalence of 1.7. and a 
prevalence of over 5% in North America and Europe (GBDIS, 1996). As with other domains 
of addiction the cause and maintenance of alcohol problems are known to be multi-factorial, 
influenced by physiology, behaviour and motivation (West, 2006). There are several 
treatments for alcohol problems which reflect the different approaches to explain addiction. 
Pharmacological interventions have been found effective in the maintenance of abstinence and 
relapse prevention as well as reducing withdrawal symptoms (Edwards, Marshall, & Cook, 
2003). Many psychological interventions have also been found effective in producing 
abstinence or reducing alcohol intake (Carroll, 2005; Curran & Drummond, 2005) including 
the twelve-step programme (TSP; Nowinski, Baker & Carroll, 1992) run by self-help 
organisations such as alcoholics anonymous. The TSP views substance abuse as arising from 
an innate vulnerability. It aims to help people acknowledge the harm addiction causes and 
accept the lack of control this imposes on them. Cognitive behavioural treatments are 
frequently used, aiming to improve coping responses to stressors (Kadden et al., 1992). 
Various other interventions involve a partner, family members or significant others in 
treatment, recognising the social context of such problems (Meyers & Miller. 200 1). MI is a 
psychological treatment for addiction which has received increasing attention. both in clinical 
practice and research. Focusing on the motivational aspect of addiction. MI aims to enhance 
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commitment to change through eliciting and resolving ambivalence. MI is described below in 
more detail. 
Motivational Interviewing 
MI is a brief intervention of one to four sessions that can be delivered as a stand-alone 
intervention or a prelude to treatment. It has also been incorporated into other interventions 
such as cognitive-behavioural-therapy (e.g. Miller, 2004; Arkowitz & Westra, 2004). MI was 
initially conceptualised by Miller in 1983 and later developed by Miller and Rollnick (1991). 
It evolved from integrating Miller's own experiences of treating alcoholism and Roger's 
(1959) person-centred approach to therapy. MI combines the empathic, warm and genuine 
style advocated by Rogers with a more directive method which helps clients explore and 
resolve their ambivalence about changing their addictive behaviour, the primary aim being to 
elicit motivation to change (Miller & Rollnick, 1991; 2002). 
Miller and Rollnick (2002) define MI as 'a client-centred, directive method for 
enhancing intrinsic motivation to change by exploring and resolving ambivalence' (p.25). 
They describe three fundamental components embodying MI: collaboration, evocation and 
autonomy. Four therapeutic principles of MI are also identified: expressing empathy, 
developing discrepancy, rolling with resistance and supporting self-efficacy. It is proposed 
that by adhering to such a style and using techniques such as open-ended questions, 
affirmation, reflective listening and summarising, the therapist can evoke the client's self-
motivational statements or 'change talk' (CT). CT is believed to strengthen the client's 
commitment to change and produce positive changes in behaviour. Since its development MI 
has undergone various adaptations, incorporating components of other interventions. Perhaps 
the most widely known and used is motivational enhancement therapy (MET). MET 
integrates personal feedback of assessment results into the overall MI style and technique 
(Miller, Sovereign & Krege, 1988). 
Theoretical Background 
In addition to the therapeutic context, Miller's (1983) early conceptualisation of MI 
was informed by theories from social psychology, particularly self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977), 
attribution of causal control (Heider, 1958), and cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957). Other 
theories infl uential in aiding the development and understanding of MI include self-perception 
theory (Bern, 1972) and reactance theory (Brehm & Brehm, 1981). Such theories have been 
influential in the development of MI's principles of avoiding confrontation and developing 
discrepancies. They have also contributed towards MI's current focus on client language 
(Moyers, 2(04). A further theory initially influential in aiding the development and 
understanding of MI is Prochaska and DiClemente's (1984) transtheoretical model. This 
model views behaviour change as a progression through five stages of awareness and 
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acknowledgement of the problem: Pre-contemplation, contemplation, preparation, action and 
maintenance. 
In terms of processes of change, cognitive dissonance was originally one of the 
fundamental concepts hypothesised to explain MI's effectiveness. In his original description 
of cognitive dissonance, Festinger (1957) posited that when an individual's cognitions or 
behaviours become inconsistent, the discomfort they experience motivates them to restore this 
imbalance and achieve consistency. Miller (1983) theorised that by enhancing a client's 
discrepancy between their current behaviour and wider goals and values, MI would induce 
such cognitive dissonance and create discomfort. He proposed that this would motivate clients 
to make positive changes to their behaviour due to an inherent dri ve towards cognitive 
consistency. The importance Miller placed on the theory of cognitive dissonance has since 
waned however (Draycott & Dabbs, 1998). Miller & Rollnick (1991; 2002) later discarded the 
role of cognitive dissonance altogether, proposing that change is simply motivated by a 
perceived discrepancy between 'the present state of affairs and how one wants to be' (pg.38). 
This position therefore makes no assumption of an inherent drive towards consistency. 
Draycott & Dabbs (1998) have criticised this change in stance. They argued for a 
continuing role for cognitive dissonance by showing how specific principles and techniques in 
MI may lead to increased dissonance and thence behaviour change. Perhaps surprisingly, 
however, the potential role of cognitive dissonance in MI has received relatively little 
attention since. 
Efficacy/Effectiveness of MI 
Table 1 provides a summary of six reviews and/or meta-analyses of outcome studies 
evaluating the efficacy of Ml. Outcome research investigates the immediate or long-term 
changes which occur as the result of therapy (Hill & Lambert, 2004). They often involve 
randornised-controlled-trials (ReT's) whereby an 'an intervention is applied to diagnosed 
cases and analysed against a comparison condition to determine the degree or relative degree 
of beneficial change associated with treatment' (Kendall, Holmbeck & Verduin, 2004; p.17). 
A distinction is made between outcome research investigating the efficacy and effectiveness 
of treatment (Hill & Lambert, 2004). The former are completed in research settings, the latter 
are completed in clinic settings and are therefore more generalisable to clinical practice. The 
reviews summarised demonstrate that MI is an efficacious treatment for substance abuse 
problems incl uding those that are alcohol related. Reductions were found in the amount of 
alcohol consumed, alcohol dependence, alcohol related problems and mental health. MI was 
found more efficacious than a no treatment control and standard care. It also demonstrated 
equivalent outcomes to other psychological treatment approaches, many of which were longer 
in duration. 
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V asilaki, Hosier and Cox (2005) provide specific support for the use of MI in 
reducing alcohol consumption, particularly for low-dependent drinkers who voluntarily seek 
help. An average of 83 minutes of MI was found more efficacious than no treatment and an 
average of 53 minutes more efficacious than a diverse range of other treatments. Vasilaki et 
ai., (2005) note that it cannot be inferred from these findings that MI reduces alcohol problems 
more than anyone treatment alone. Evidence also exists to support the use of MI in treating 
other behavioural domains such as diet/exercise, diabetes control and treatment compliance. 
Conclusions regarding the efficacy of MI in reducing smoking and HIV risk-taking behaviours 
are inconsistent (Burke, Arkowitz & Menchola, 2003; Hettema, Steele & Miller, 2005). The 
strongest evidence for MI remains in the treatment of substance abuse. 
Various methodological limitations exist in the MI outcome literature (See Table 1). 
Overall, the studies are limited by the variability in the delivery of MI. Firm conclusions 
about which variation of MI is effective are difficult to make. Separating mode of delivery 
Hettema et ai., (2005) found MI to be efficacious as a stand-alone treatment and as an addition 
to other interventions. Variability also exists in the duration and number of sessions of MI 
delivered. Little is known about how much MI is needed to ensure it produces the desired 
effects. Some individual studies are also limited in their methodological quality. Specific MI 
procedures are not always standardized or carefully described, integrity checks are not 
completed and process measures not included. No empirical evaluations have been completed 
testing pure forms of MI as defined by Miller and Rollnick (2002). Rather studies integrate 
principles of MI into other treatments (Burke, Dunn, Atkins & Phelps, 2004). It is not known 
which aspects of MI and its adaptations are responsible for the outcomes. These limitations 
are highlighted through the finding of Hettema and colleagues (2005) that MI does not 
consistently improve outcomes. A high variability in effect sizes was found across studies and 
therapists. Although the meta-analyses show MI to be efficacious in the treatment of 
substance abuse, more effectiveness studies are needed to evaluate how MI transfers to 
clinical practice. 
Two large multi-centre RCT's have investigated the comparative effectiveness of MI 
and other active interventions in treating alcohol problems (Project Match Research Group. 
1997; UKATT Research Team, 2005). The aim of Project Match (1997) was to investigate 
the benefits of matching clients with alcohol problems to cognitive-behavioural-coping-skills-
therapy (CBCST), MET, or 12-step facilitation therapy according to various client attributes. 
Reduction in the frequency and severity of drinking alcohol was maintained from pre-
treatment to one year post-treatment for all treatments with minimal variation between them. 
MET was found to differentially benefit outpatient clients high in anger in comparison to the 
other treatments (Project Match Research Group. 1997). It was hypothesised that this finding 
is due to MI's non-confrontative nature. This matching effect was also evident at three-year 
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follow-up (Project Match Research Group, 1998). Reductions in drinking observed one-year 
post-treatment were sustained for all treatments over the three-year follow-up period. 
Explanations for Mrs Effectiveness 
Research Identifying the Active Ingredients of MI 
The aims of this section are to: a) critically evaluate process studies which have 
enhanced understanding of why MI is effective; and b) identify what aspects of the process of 
MI have yet to be explored. Process research is a method for empirically evaluating which 
features of the therapeutic process are helpful or detrimental to the client (Orlinsky, Ronnestad 
& Willutzki, 2004). Table 2 provides an outline of six process studies which have enhanced 
understanding of the active ingredients of MI. All studies are secondary analyses of 
previously completed research and employ an observational design. A common tool used to 
investigate the process of MI is the Motivational Interviewing Skills Code (MISC) 1 .0 
(Moyers, Martin, Catley, Harris & Ahluwalia, 2003) and the revised version (MISC 2.0; 
Miller, Moyers, Ernst & Amrhein, 2003). The MISC is a behavioural coding system which 
measures the process of therapy and was designed to capture elements of theoretical interest in 
the practice of MI, both in terms of the client and therapist speech and the interaction between 
them. The MISC 2.0 was further developed to capture more detailed aspects of client change 
talk (CT). CT was coined by Miller and Rollnick (2002) to describe language used by clients 
to indicate commitment to change. The MI process studies reviewed have explored the 
expression of client CT, its association with outcome, therapist training and therapist 
adherence to MI. The relationship between therapist behaviours, specific and non-specific to 
MI, and other within-session client behaviours such as engagement have also been examined. 
The contribution of this research to the understanding of client CT and other within-session 
behaviours in MI is summarised below. 
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PAGE NUMBERING AS IN THE 
ORIGINAL THESIS 
Table 1: Summary of Reviews Evaluating the Efficacy of MI 
Authors 
Noonan and Moyers 
(997) 
Dunn, Deroo & 
Rivara (2001) 
Burke, Arkowitz & 
Menchola (2003) 
Hettema, Steele & 
Miller (2005) 
Design 
Review 
Review 
Meta-
analysis 
Meta-
analysis 
No. of 
Studies 
11 
29 
30 
72 
Comparison 
Treatments 
NT,CT 
NT,CT 
NT, P, ST, 
CFI, 
CCC,CBT, 
12S, 
NT,WLC, 
EI 
Behavioural 
Domains 
Alcohol abuse 
Drug abuse 
Substance abuse 
HIV risk taking 
behaviour 
Dietl exercise 
Smoking 
Substance abuse 
Eating disorders 
Diet I exercise 
Smoking cessation 
HIV risk 
Treatment 
compliance 
Alcohol abuse 
Smoking 
HIV/AIDS 
Drug abuse 
Treatment 
compliance 
Gambling 
Intimate relationships 
Water 
purification/safety 
Eating disorders 
Diet/exercise 
Main Conclusions 
9 studies supported the efficacy of 
Ml's for addictive behaviours. 2 did 
not. 
Strongest evidence in the treatment of 
alcohol and drug abuse. Evidence in 
other domains is promising but not 
supportive of dissemination. 
AMI > NT and P for alcohol, drug, 
diet and exercise problems. AMI = 
ST, CBT, 12S, CFI, CCC. No support 
in efficacy of MI in treating smoking 
and HIV risk behaviours. 
51 (l/(l AMI improved at FU. 
37% NT/ST improved at FU. 
Significant effect of MI across many 
behavioural domains. Strongest 
support for MI efficacy in treating 
substance abuse. MI unsuccessful in 
reducing smoking. MI not consistently 
found to improve outcome. High 
variability in effect sizes across 
studies and therapists. Effective as a 
stand-alone treatment and as an 
addition to other interventions. 
Additional 
Comments 
Possible 
selection bias. 
Meta-analysis 
not possible 
Possible 
selection bias. 
Meta-analysis 
not possible. 
Possible 
impact of 
therapeutic 
allegiance 
Lack of 
information 
regarding 
therapist 
training or 
TIMI. 
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Authors 
Rubak, Sanbaek, 
Lauritzen & 
Christensen(2005) 
Vasilaki, Hosier & 
Cox (2006) 
Design 
Systematic 
revIew 
Meta-
analysis 
Meta-
analysis 
No. of 
Studies 
72 
22 
Comparison 
Treatments 
TAG 
NT, TAU, 
DCC, EI, 
SBC,CBT 
Behavioural 
Domains 
Diabetes/asthma 
Smoking cessation 
Weight -loss/physical 
activity 
Alcohol abuse 
Psychiatrics/addiction 
Alcohol abuse 
Main Conclusions 
MI > TAG in approximately 
80% of studies. Significant 
effect of MI across many 
behavioural domains. MI can be 
effective in brief encounters of 
only 15 minutes 
MI is an efficacious intervention 
in reducing alcohol 
consumption. 
-87 mins MI > NT <3 months. 
-53 mins MI > diverse range of 
other treatments. 
Additional 
Comments 
All but one RCT 
found to have high 
methodological 
quality. Systematic 
review: meta-
analysis only 
preformed on 1 9 
studies. 
Cannot be inferred 
that MI is more 
efficacious than 
any treatment 
alone. Low 
generalisability 
(heavy or low 
dependent 
drinkers). 
Note - NT: no treatment; CT: comparison treatment; P: placebo; ST: standard treatment; CFI: confrontational-focused intervention; CCC: client-
centred counselling; CBT: cognitive-behavioural-therapy; 12S: 12-step facilitation programme; WLC: waiting-list control; E: educational intervention; 
TAG: traditional advice giving; TAU: treatment as usual; DCC: directive-confrontational-counselling; SBC: Skills-based counselling. 
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Client CT 
Amrhein et al., (2003) provided evidence supporting Miller and Rollnick's C~002) 
hypothesis that an integral element of MI is increasing commitment to change. They used the 
MISC 2.0 to investigate the association between CT and outcome through video tapes of drug-
abusing clients receiving one session of MI. The MISC 2.0 separates CT into commitment 
language and various dimensions proposed to underlie it (desire, perceived ability, readiness, 
reasons and need). Evaluating the expression of both commitment to status quo and change, they 
found the strength but not the frequency of such utterances to predict subsequent abstinence. This 
may explain the failure of previous research focusing on the frequency of CT to find such a 
relationship (Miller, Benefield & Tonigan, 1993; Miller, Yahne & Tonigan. 2003. Peterson, 
1997). Commitment language was most predictive of outcome when it occurred near the end of 
the session. The authors concluded that the underlying dimensions of commitment language did 
not directly improve the prediction of treatment outcomes, yet did directly influence commitment 
strength. 
Amrhein and colleagues (2003) investigated the association between patterns in the 
frequency and strength of client commitment language and specific aspects of the MI intervention. 
The intervention was separated into 10 six minute segments and the MI manual was used to 
identify what would be expected to be occurring during these segments. Commitment language 
was found to drop when clients were asked to generate and evaluate a change plan. It was 
suggested that therapists be continuously sensitive to fluctuations in commitment language. The 
authors propose that if commitment language drops alternative strategies should be used to restore 
it. Overall, the need for flexibility in the delivery of MI is emphasised. Amrhein and colleagues 
(2003) findings should however be interpreted with caution. Only a small frequency of utterances 
occurred in each of the 10 segments the MI session was separated into. Assumptions were also 
made that therapists were following a strictly timed MI procedure, whereby the occurrence of 
different aspects of the intervention neatly mapped on to the 10 segments identified. 
In further research Amrhein and colleagues (2004) found strength of commitment 
language increased with therapist training in MI. This suggests that MI may be responsible for the 
change in commitment language, though adherence to MI was not assessed. Catley et al .. (2006) 
found global therapist adherence to MI and therapist behaviours consistent with MI (MICO) to be 
associated with more CT. In an analysis of how specific therapist behaviours predicted CT they 
found reflecting and reframing to be most highly related. Unexpectedly. raising concern which is 
inconsistent with MI (MIIN) was also found to predict CT. Other MIIN behaviours such as 
confrontation were not associated with what the authors coined resistant CT. \' arious wcaknesses 
however exist in this study. The original MISC 1.0 (Moyers et al .. 2003) utilised did not allO\v 
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Table 2: Outline of Research Investigating the Active Ingredients of MI 
Authors 
Amrhein, Miller, 
Yahne, Palmer & 
Fulcher (2003) 
Amrhein, Miller, 
Yahne, Kupsky & 
Hochstein, (2004) 
Moyers, Miller & 
Hendrickson 
(2005) 
Catley ('{ al., 
(2006 ) 
No. of 
sessions 
84 
44 
103 
X6 
Behavioural 
Domain 
Drug abuse 
Drug abuse 
Drug abuse 
Smoking 
cessation 
Primary aim 
Investigate the 
link between 
frequency and 
strength of client 
CT and outcome 
Investigate the 
association 
between therapist 
training and CT 
Investigate the 
relationship 
between therapist 
interpersonal 
skills and client 
involvement. 
Investigate the 
link between 
TIMI, client CT 
and other within-
session client 
behaviours 
Process 
Measures 
MISC 2.0 
MISC 2.0 
MISC 1.0 
MISC 1.0 
Main conclusions 
The strength but not the 
frequency of CT was 
associated with outcome. CT 
was particular associated with 
outcome when it occurred near 
the end of the session. 
Frequency of CT increased 
with therapist training 
Therapist interpersonal skills 
directly facilitated client 
involvement. 
Global adherence to MI and 
MICO therapist behaviours 
positively associated with 
increased frequency of CT and 
client within-session 
behaviours. 
Comments 
A small frequency 
of utterances 
occurred in each 
decile. Assumption 
that therapists were 
following a strictly 
timed procedure 
No association with 
outcome 
Potential sampling 
bias Uneven inter-
rater reliability No 
association with 
outcome 
No association 
made with outcome. 
Strength of change 
talk not 
investigated. 
Limited 
general isahil ity 
\:1 
Authors 
Boardman et al., 
(2006) 
Moyers & Martin, 
(2006) 
No. of 
sessions 
46 
38 
Behavioural 
Domain 
Smoking 
cessation 
Alcohol 
abuse 
Primary aim 
Examine the 
association 
between MIIN 
and MICa 
therapist 
behaviours and 
client 
engagement. 
Analyse if a 
temporal 
sequence between 
MICa and MIIN 
therapist 
behaviours and 
CT could be 
identified. 
Process 
Measures 
MISC 1.0 
VPPS 
WAI 
SCOPE 
Main conclusions 
Adherence to MI positively 
associate with client in session 
behaviours 
MICa behaviours most likely 
followed by CT and MIIN 
behaviours by counter CT 
Comments 
Therapist and client 
behaviours rated 
separatel y . 
Limited 
generalisabiliity 
No association with 
outcome 
Strength of CT not 
investigated. Small 
sample size. No 
association with 
outcome. 
Note - CT: Change Talk; TIMI: Therapist Integrity to Motivational Interviewing; MIIN: Therapist Behaviours Inconsistent with MI; MICa: Therapist 
Behaviours Consistent with MI; MISC: Motivational Interviewing Skills Code; SCOPE: Sequential Code for Observing Process Exchange; W AI: 
Working Alliance Inventory; VPPS: Vanderbilt Psychotherapy Process Scale. 
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evaluation of the influence of therapist behaviours on the strength of CT. It is the strength of CT 
which Amrhein and colleagues (2003) found associated with outcome. Although good inter-rater 
reliability was found for overall global adherence to MI, individual MIIN and MICO behaviours 
were less reliable. As the original trial of this study was not primarily aimed at evaluating MI 
specifically, more specialized training in MI was not provided. MI may therefore have been 
occurring at a different level of expertise than that which tends to occur in clinical practice. The 
study is also limited in its generalisability as it is restricted to African-Caribbeans and the 
treatment of smoking cessation. It does however provide preliminary evidence that better 
adherence to MI leads to an increased frequency of CT, a finding supported in an exploratory 
study by Martin and Moyers (2003). 
Recognising the correlational nature of these findings, Moyers and Martin (2006) 
developed a sequential behavioural coding system (the sequential code for observing process 
exchanges~ SCOPE). The SCOPE analysed whether a temporal sequence between MICO, MIIN 
therapist behaviours and client CT could be identified. They hypothesized that if MI theory is 
accurate, client CT should be more probable immediately after MICO therapist behaviour. The 
SCOPE was partially derived from elements of the MISC 2.0 (Miller et al., 2003). Their results 
strengthened previous findings supporting the relationship between therapist behaviours and CT. 
MICO therapist behaviours were most likely followed by CT and MIIN therapist behaviours by 
counter CT. CT was also more likely to follow other therapist behaviours such as feedback, 
reflections and optimism, indicating that MICO therapist behaviours are not the only behaviours 
to lead to CT. Although the various categories of CT identified by the MISC 2.0 (Miller et al., 
2003) such as desire and commitment were also included in the SCOPE, the small sample size did 
not enable each category to be examined independently. The SCOPE is also limited in that it only 
analysed the frequency of CT and not the strength. Given Amrhien and colleagues (2003) finding 
that only the strength of CT is related to outcome, it cannot be assumed that such a relationship 
would be found with the processes examined in this study. Process-outcome links were not 
investigated. Moyers and Martin (2006) also highlight that although these results strengthen 
evidence that therapist behaviours predict CT, it remains possible that a third unnamed event 
which has not been examined is influencing both therapist and client behaviours. 
Client Within-session Behaviours 
Moyer et al" (2005) assessed the influence therapist interpersonal skills had on client 
involvement through analysing MI delivered by therapists with varying degrees of training and 
competence. Using the MISC 1.0 to evaluate therapist and client behaviours they found therapist 
interpersonal skills (i .e. empathy. acceptance, egalitarianism. warmth, genuineness and overall MI 
spirit) to directly facilitate client involvement (i.e. cooperation, disclosure and engagement). 
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Unexpectedly, MIIN therapist behaviours were not found to decrease client involvement. Of 
particular interest was their finding that when MIIN therapist behaviours such as confrontation 
were delivered in a good interpersonal style, a positive relationship was found with client 
involvement. This study is however limited due to uneven inter-rater reliability in coding, 
resulting in some client characteristics being eliminated. Catley et at., (2006) also found 
adherence to MI positively associated with client within-session behaviour (affect. cooperation. 
disclosure and engagement). Boardman et at., (2005) expanded these findings by assessing client 
involvement through measures validated in the psychotherapy literature rather than the MISC. 
They examined the association between MIIN and MICa therapist behaviours, client engagement 
as measured by the Vanderbilt Psychotherapy Process Scale - Revised, observer version (VPPS; 
O'Malley, 1983) and working alliance as measured by the Working Alliance Inventory - observer 
version (W AI; Horvah & Greenberg, 1989). Consistent with previous research the overall style of 
MI (acceptance, egalitarianism, warmth, genuineness, empathy and overall adherence to MI 
'spirit') was positively associated with within-session client behaviours (expression of affect, 
cooperation, disclosure and engagement). Congruent with Catley and colleagues' (2006) findings, 
confrontation was significantly negatively related to positive within-session behaviours. 
In summary, there is now evidence supporting Miller and Rollnick's (2002) view on the 
significance of the spirit or overall style of MI in improving client collaboration and engagement 
and reducing resistance. Evidence also indicates that MI enhances motivation to change, as 
hypothesised. There are many methodological limitations in this research, however. There is 
often little variability in therapist adherence to MI, limiting conclusions regarding the impact of 
MI adherence on CT and other within-session client behaviours. The first 20 minutes of a session 
have commonly been used for analysis, possibly missing events occurring at different stages of 
therapy. The majority of studies have included AMI's, however little is known about the impact 
aspects such as feedback are having on process and outcome. The processes and active 
ingredients identified cannot be assumed to be unique to MI and may also occur in other 
psychological treatments. With the exception of Amrhein and colleagues (2003), no other 
research has matched process with outcome. In addition, where client behaviour is a focus in 
research, verbalisations are typically coded in terms of the extent to which they convey an 
intention to change and engagement with the therapist. Although many interesting relationships 
between client and therapist behaviours have been noted, we are arguably still far from 
understanding why client commitment language during an MI session is predictive of subsequent 
behaviour change and the processes underlying the client's decision. Such an understanding may 
benefit from further consideration of relevant models from social psychology. 
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Increasing Motivation to Change: Current Models 
Miller and Rollnick (2002) hypothesise that exploring and resolving ambivalence is a 
critical task in enhancing motivation and a key aspect ofMI. They propose that ambivalence is 
elicited through amplifying - from the client's perspective - a discrepancy between the present 
state of affairs and how one wants to be. Originally, however, Miller (1983) described this process 
in terms of developing a discrepancy between a person's present behaviour and their broader 
goals and values, creating an experience of cognitive dissonance. Miller and Rollnick (2002) 
subsequently rejected this as an explanatory model. In doing so they aim to avoid an inherent 
aspect of cognitive dissonance: that the experience of inconsistent cognitions results in a drive 
towards achieving cognitive consistency. The concepts of ambivalence, cognitive dissonance and 
the notion of a discrepancy between the actual and ideal are frequently referred to in the MI 
literature, however these concepts are rarely described in detail. 
It is argued that if the findings obtained so far from studies of the process of MI are to be 
placed within an explanatory model, the decision to reject cognitive dissonance should be 
revisited. The next chapter offers a review of the current social psychology literature on 
discrepancy, ambivalence and cognitive dissonance and the extent to which this literature offers a 
potential model for the process of change in clients highlighted in research on MI. 
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CHAPTER 2: DISSONANCE AND AMBIVALENCE IN THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 
LITERATURE 
This chapter begins by providing an overview of two discrepancy-related theories: 
cognitive dissonance and ambivalence. Research investigating their original conceptualization. in 
addition to that addressing any revision or developments is discussed. The common attributes of 
both theories are explored, and their differences outlined. The latter section of this chapter explores 
the extent to which cognitive dissonance and ambivalence theory provide a potential model for the 
processes of change indicated in MI research. Aspects of these two discrepancy-related theories 
currently captured in MI are considered. Components which appear to not yet have been 
incorporated into the existing understanding of MI's motivational processes are discussed in the 
context of how they may expand current understanding of Mrs theoretical underpinnings. 
Consideration of ambivalence and cognitive dissonance theories, within the context of MI, results in 
a diagram outlining the hypothesised motivational processes occurring in effective MI (Appendix 
1). It is noted that this hypothesised process is not a linear development, as the client will most 
likely go back and forth through the various stages. 
Cognitive Dissonance 
Overview of Cognitive Dissonance 
Festinger (1957) postulated that when a person holds two or more cognitions inconsistent 
of one another they experience an uncomfortable tension. It is this tension he termed cognitive 
dissonance. He proposed that the tension, or cognitive dissonance, experienced has drive-like 
properties. These properties motivate a person to reduce this uncomfortable experience by 
changing one or more of their cognitions, in an attempt to make them consonant. Cognitions must 
be relevant to one another in order for them to be consistent or inconsistent. 
Since its development cognitive dissonance has become one of the best-known and 
documented theories in social psychology, generating much research, revision and controversy. 
The use the concept cognition meant the theory was stated in very general and highly abstract 
terms. Cognition is any piece of knowledge a person might have, whether about behaviours. 
attitudes, perceptions, beliefs or feelings. They can be about oneself, another person. a group of 
people or things in the environment. Cognitive inconsistency can occur within or between any of 
these psychological representations. One may hold two attitudes inconsistent with one another. or 
hold an attitude inconsistent to their behaviour. One may have a strong belief but also feel 
emotions which contrast their belief. Festinger insisted that anyone who experiences such 
inconsistencies in their social life will be driven to resolve that inconsistency. 
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This is illustrated through Festinger's example of cognitive inconsistencies occurring in a 
real life setting. An article in a local newspaper reported on a group of people united in the belief 
that the earth was going to be annihilated by a cataclysmic flood on December 21, 1955. It was 
believed by this group that everyone would perish except for those who had faith in the 
prophecies emanating from the planet Clarion. Festinger, Rieckan and Schachter (1956, c.f., 
Cooper et al., 2007) hypothesised that if the earth survived this cataclysmic event this group of 
people, he labelled the Seekers, would face a considerable amount of inconsistency. Their 
extremely strong belief of what was to happen to the world would be inconsistent with what did 
happen. This dramatic inconsistency would induce a state of cognitive dissonance, which they 
would be driven to reduce. One of Festinger's researchers infiltrated the group and observed the 
events as they unfolded. Clarion's space ship was due to appear at midnight. As the final seconds 
approached and no ship appeared one member informed the group that his watch said 11 .55pm. 
All watches were reset. Another member noticed that he had a metal filling in his tooth: The 
Clarions had insisted that all metal objects be removed. The ship still did not appear. After 
4.00am the leader of the group received her final message from the clarion: 'This little group 
sitting all night long has spread so much goodness and light that the God of the Universe spared 
the earth from destruction'. They shared this new finding with the public. As Festinger 
predicted, when caught in a major inconsistency between their beliefs, behaviours and 
observations of reality, The Seekers were driven to find a way to restore their inconsistency. 
Dissonance: Its Magnitude and Reduction 
Dissonance differs from other theories of inconsistency in that it has a magnitude 
(Festinger, 1957). The greater the discrepancy between cognitions, the more dissonance 
experienced; the greater the consonance between cognitions the less tension experienced. The 
magnitude of dissonance is also influenced by their importance. The more important the 
discrepant cognitions the more cognitive dissonance experienced; the more important the 
consonant cognitions the less cognitive dissonance experienced. To summarise this Festinger 
developed a formula stipulating that the magnitude of cognitive dissonance equals the number of 
discrepant cognitions multiplied by their importance divided by the number of consonant 
cognitions multiplied by their importance. The magnitude is therefore proportional to the number 
of discrepant cognitions a person has, and inversely proportional to the number of cognitions that 
are consonant, each weighted by importance (Festinger, 1957). 
The experience of dissonance can be reduced by removing inconsistent cognitions. adding 
new cognitions which are consonant, reducing the importance of inconsistent cognitions. or 
increasing the importance of consonant cognitions (Festinger, 1957). How it actually gets reduced 
depends on how resistant the various relevant cognitions are to change with the least resistant 
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cognitions being more likely to change. Harmon-Jones and Mills (1999) propose that this 
resistance is based on the extent to which the cognitions are consonant with other cognitions held. 
and the responsiveness of the cognition. When dissonance in cognitions is experienced. it is more 
likely to be reduced by changing ones attitude rather than ones behaviour. Schultz and Lepper 
(1996) state that it derives from the extent to which a change may produce a new experience of 
dissonance, the degree to which the cognition is anchored in reality, and how difficult it is to 
change those aspects of reality. 
Dissonance Research 
Cognitive dissonance is predominantly investigated through the observation of 
behaviourally induced experiments. Research tends to fall under four paradigms investigating 
what happens after an individual has made a decision: free choice, belief-disconfirmation. effort-
justification and induced-compliance (Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999). The latter three paradigms 
fall under an umbrella paradigm titled insufficient justification (Schultz & Lepper, 1996). 
Respectively these paradigms are concerned with the consequences of being exposed to 
information inconsistent with a prior belief, the effects of effort expenditure, and what happens 
after a person acts in ways that are discrepant with their beliefs and attitudes. Festinger's study of 
'The Seekers' provides evidence of the belief-disconfirmation paradigm whereby people are 
exposed to information which is inconsistent with their belief. As illustrated in this study those 
who do not change their belief attempt to reduce their dissonance by misinterpretating, rejecting 
or refuting the new information they are provided with or seeking support from those who agree 
with one's belief, 
Dissonance was also proposed to be experienced when a person engages in an activity 
which is effortful or unpleasant in order to reach an outcome which is desirable. Their cognition 
that the activity is unpleasant is inconsistent with their behaviour. It was hypothesised that in 
order to reduce their dissonance a person would exaggerate the desirability of the outcome, known 
as the effort-justification paradigm. Aronson and Mills (1959) asked women to undergo various 
activities to join a group which was dull and boring. Some women underwent an embarrassing 
activity. whereby they were asked to read aloud various words associated with sex and two vivid 
descriptions of sexual activity, whilst others did not. Those who underwent the embarrassing 
activity when initiated rated the group more favourably that those who did not. 
When a person does or says something which is inconsistent with a prior attitude or 
belief, cognitive dissonance is aroused. The induced-compliance paradigm hypothesises that 
incentives to carry out such behaviour such as promises of rewards or threats of punishment 
reduce this dissonance, providing justifications for the behaviour through increasing cognitions 
consonant with it. Festinger and Carlsmith (1957) first tested this hypothesis by getting 71 men to 
participate in a 1 hour group. Participants were told that two groups were being held. In one. no 
introduction was given and in the other, participants were told that the task was enjoyable by a 
participant who had supposedly completed the task. Participants were asked to substitute for this 
person and either given $1 or $20 to do so. When subsequently asked to evaluate the task those 
paid $1 rated them more enjoyable than those paid $20. In the forbidden to), paradigm Aronson 
& Carlsmith (1963) provided young children with the opportunity to play with a toy. Some were 
threatened with mild punishment if they were to play with an attracti ve toy. others with severe 
punishment. Later children were asked to evaluate the attractive toy. Those threatened with mild 
punishment evaluated the toy more highly than whose threatened with severe punishment. 
Finally, in free choice experiments participants are given two objects they have stated as 
being similar in value to them and asked to make a choice between them. It is hypothesised that 
once a person makes such a decision dissonance is aroused. Even though this decision has been 
made one continues to hold negative cognitions towards what they have chosen and positive 
cognitions towards that which they have rejected. Brehm (1956) asked 225 women to: a) rate a 
variety of manufactured objects in desirability; b) choose between two of the objects rated; c) re-
rate the desirability of the objects. Women who had a difficult decision to make changed their 
evaluations, rating their chosen product more positive and their rejected product less positive. 
This is known as spreading of alternatives. Spreading of alternatives was less for women who had 
an easier decision to make. 
Development and Revision 
The indirect nature of cognitive dissonance experiments left it open to much revision and 
development. For the most part these revised theories agree with Festinger's assertion that the 
experience of dissonance results in a motivation to change cognitions. Differences exist in what is 
proposed to underlie this motivation, however. Revisions include self-consistency theory 
(Aronson, 1968), self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988), and new look theory (Cooper & Fazio, 
1984). Self-consistency and self-affirmation theory both share the assumption that the self-
concept is involved in the production and reduction of dissonance. Self-consistency theory 
proposes that dissonance is created when there is a discrepancy between what a person does and 
their view of themselves as a moral, rational and competent person. In contrast, self-affirmation 
theory argues against the idea that dissonance is a result of an inconsistency in cognitions but 
rather due to behaving in away that threatens a person's sense of morality and integrity. The new 
look theory also contests the idea that inconsistent cognitions are necessary in the production of 
dissonance. Instead the emphasis is upon the idea that dissonance is the result of feeling 
personally responsible for producing an aversive consequence. 
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Others have argued that the original theory is viable and can explain evidence generated 
by those who have revised it (Beavious & Joule, 1999). Research investigating the experience of 
dissonance as psychological discomfort has provided evidence which supports Festinger's original 
postulation and contests some of those theories which have followed. Festinger (1957) 
conceptualised cognitive dissonance in two ways: as a bodily condition similar to tension or a 
state of drive like hunger and as an experience of ps ychological discomfort. Research has 
primarily focused upon the former (Cooper, 2007). Investigations tended to evaluate the arousal 
state in two ways: manipulating experiments through the introduction of a supposedly ingested 
placebo or drug that would lead to relaxation, or direct physiological assessments. In a review of 
the literature Copper (2007) concludes that dissonance unequivocally possesses arousal properties. 
Elliott and Devine (1994) provided the first systematic empirical study evaluating the 
psychological discomfort component of dissonance. They developed a self-report measure of 
affect representing an amalgam of dissonance related terms (e.g. uncomfortable, uneasy, bothered) 
and other non dissonance related affect items (e.g. guilty, unhappy). Participants were either 
asked to complete a counter-attitudinal or pro-attitudinal essay based on university tuition fees. 
Participants who freely consented to complete the counter-attitudinal essay reported greater 
discomfort than those who completed the pro-attitudinal essay and the baseline controls. Those 
whose dissonance was induced during the experiments reported baseline levels of discomfort 
immediately after changing their attitudes. Non-dissonance related affect items were not 
influenced by the experimental manipulation. These results provide confirmation that dissonance 
is actually experienced as psychological discomfort as originally postulated by Festinger, as well 
as demonstrating that this discomfort is alleviated on the implementation of a reduction strategy. 
Research has shown that holding cognitions which are inconsistent is not necessarily 
sufficient to result in the experience of dissonance. It has been proposed that certain conditions 
need to be met in order for dissonance to be aroused. Such conditions include the freedom to 
choose your behaviour (Linder, Cooper & Jones, 1967), a commitment towards that behaviour 
(Carlsmith, Collins & Helmreich, 1966), the possibility of an aversive consequence (Nel, 
Helmrich & Carlson, 1969), the forseeability of such an aversive consequence (Cooper. 1968), 
individual differences in preference for consistency (Ciadldini et al., 1994) and the awareness of 
cognitions (Zanna, Lepper & Abelson, 1973). 
The Impact of the Self in the Experience of Dissonance. 
In Festinger's original proposition he argued that cognitive dissonance could occur when 
a person experiences inconsistencies about oneself. Research rarely investigated the impact of 
the self in the experience of dissonance, however. Cooper (2007) provides a review of three 
revised dissonance theories which illustrate the involvement of the self in the experience of 
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cognitive dissonance. Steele's (1988) self-affirmation theory, argues cognitive dissonance occurs 
when a person's self-system is threatened. When a person's behaviour contradicts their view of 
themselves as a good and moral person, dissonance is experienced. For example, if a person 
drinks alcohol and hits their partner, yet views themselves as a good and moral person, dissonance 
may be experienced. Steele's theory proposes that in order to protect their self system a person 
may distort or add cognitions about themselves. The person who hit their partner might therefore 
argue that the drink was responsible for the behaviour, or that they were provoked. Steele also 
argued that threats to the self system can be repaired through a variety of ways unrelated to the 
behaviour at hand. The goal therefore is not specifically about rectifying the behaviour, but can 
be about affirming global integrity. Importantly, unlike Festinger's original theory, Steele 
proposes that inconsistent cognitions are not necessary in the production of dissonance. 
Aronson's self- consistency theory (1968) similarly argues for a central role for a person's 
self concept. This theory views a person as generally having a high self esteem and that 
discomfort results when anything threatens this, producing motivation to decrease this 
inconsistency. Unlike Steele's theory, Aronson places emphasis on dissonance occurring when a 
person acts in a way which is different to what they expect of themselves. Self-consistency theory 
sees inconsistency as an important part of the dissonance experience. 
Cooper (2007) has gone further in combining their new look theory with theories of the 
self to develop a self-standard model of cognitive dissonance. They argue that there are two 
major categories of standards a person uses to appraise the consequences of their behaviour~ 
normative and personal, with normative judgements based on the perception of what the majority 
of people in a culture would see to be normal, and personal upon characteristics unique to the 
individual and the judgements they make when considering their own values. They argue that if a 
person uses personal standards to judge their behaviour they will experience idiographic 
dissonance, and as is true in other theories the magnitude of the dissonance experienced will be 
affected by what they think about themselves. In contrast, if a person uses a normative judgement 
individual differences in self esteem are not relevant, rather, dissonance occurs because the 
consequence of the behaviour is judged as being aversive or negative. They refer to this as 
nomothetic dissonance whereby self esteem plays no role. They argue that the standard used to 
judge behaviour is determined by the accessibility of this standard, such as cultural norms or 
unique personal characteristics. There is great individual variation. 
Awareness of Cognitions 
Festinger (1957) proposed that a way to reduce dissonance is to forget the importance of 
the cognitions relevant to the dissonance experienced. It is also argued that stopping thinking, a 
form of distraction, may be a commonly used strategy for restoring cognitive consistency (Hardyk 
and Kardush, 1968). Zanna et at., (1973) used a variation of the forbidden toy paradigm to 
investigate the influence awareness of inconsistent cognitions can have on the dissonance process. 
An awareness condition was added whereby following the threat manipulation a sticker with an X 
on it was placed on the side of the forbidden toy. The children were told that the sticker was there 
to remind them of the consequences which would ensue if they were to play with the forbidden 
toy. A janitor then entered the room and incidentally asked the children why they were not 
playing with the forbidden toy. In the high-accessibility condition the janitor called even more 
attention to the toy by saying 'what is this toy doing over here on the table?' and 'how come this 
toy has a sticker on it?' Children in the high-accessibility mild threat condition decreased their 
evaluation of the forbidden toy more than children in the other conditions. Zanna et at .. (1973) 
concluded that the toy derogation in this group occurred because the increased accessibility of 
their inconsistent cognitions led to a more intense experience of psychological discomfort, and a 
greater motivation to achieve cognitive consistency. This provides support for the idea that the 
simultaneous awareness of cognitive inconsistencies moderates the experience of dissonance. 
McGregor et at., (1999) suggest the simultaneous awareness of cognitions can be used to 
explain conclusions made by revisionists of the original theory of dissonance. In terms of Copper 
and Fazio's (1984) New Look theory, they argue that the perception that one has caused an 
aversive consequence. such as doing harm to an audience who do not deserve it, is likely a 
relatively new and unexpected realisation for most people. This may lead to an increase in 
attributional activity which could result in their behaviour and the inconsistent cognitions related 
to the behaviour becoming hyper-accessible. They argue that the guilt associated with such 
behaviour may motivate a person to attempt the suppression of its awareness, resulting in hypo-
accessibility. Similarly, they claim that in self-affirmation theory behaviour which contrasts that 
which has been deemed acceptable or moral is more likely to remain accessible due to heightened 
attributional activity and self reference. 
Research using the dissonance paradigm suggests that the simultaneous awareness of 
inconsistent cognitions plays an important role in the process. Conclusions must however be 
tentative given the scarce amount of literature and methodological limitations generally inherent 
in dissonance research. For example, the study by Zanna et at., (1973) is limited in that it 
experimentally manipulates the accessibility of cognitions and infers the experience of 
psychological discomfort, rather than directly measuring their existence. McGregor et at .. (1999) 
highlight how the ambivalence paradigm combined with Basilli's (1996) technique for measuring 
the simultaneous accessibility of attitude components provides an excellent opportunity to 
overcome such methodological controversies. whilst also providing a fresh perspective that 
oruanises and extends dissonance theory. C' 
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Ambivalence 
The concept of ambivalence was first originated by Scott in 1966, and gained a 
resurgence of interest in the 1990's. In a review of various definitions of ambivalence, Connor & 
Sparks (2002) conclude that commonly held themes include the simultaneous existence of positil'e 
and negative evaluations of an attitude object. Like cognitive dissonance, an essential component 
of ambivalence is the idea that people hold evaluations which are inconsistent of one another. 
Supporting the conclusion of Zanna et al., (1973) that the simultaneous awareness of inconsistent 
cognitions moderates the experience of dissonance, the simultaneous accessibility of evaluations 
has been argued to be key in the experience of ambivalence. Similar to cognitive dissonance, the 
experience of ambivalence is described as an unpleasant feeling of discomfort or conflict. The 
concept of ambivalence focuses on attitudes rather than the broad range of psychological 
representations encompassed in Festinger's use of the term 'cognition'. Traditionally research has 
conceptualised attitudes as either positive or negative evaluations of objects (see Eagly and 
Chaiken, 1993). More recent research into the definitions of attitudes have found that attitudes are 
not always polarised and that it is possible to hold both positive and negative evaluations towards 
the same attitude object simultaneously. This interest in the concept of ambivalence can therefore 
be partially attributed to new research on attitudes. Attitudes have been identified to encompass 
evaluations of other people, places, products, issues, ideas, activities and objects. People can 
therefore hold inconsistent evaluations or be ambivalent towards any of these attitude objects. An 
attitude object has been identified as behaviours, targets, events or states of affairs, and again one 
may feel ambivalent towards any of these attitude objects. In the ambivalence literature the term 
attitudes also encompasses other concepts such as thoughts, beliefs and feelings. 
Measuring Ambivalence 
Controversy exists regarding the best way to measure ambivalence (Connor & Sparks, 
2002; Connor & Armitage, in press). Connor and Armitage (in press) identify two broad 
approaches which are most commonly adopted in research. One is to measure the discomfort or 
conflict experienced by an individual, or what is termed 'felt ambivalence'. Felt ambivalence 
tends to be measured by asking people to make meta-judgements about their own levels of 
discomfort about a particular issue, thereby focusing them on relevant subset of feelings and away 
from irrelevant influences. For example, Priester and Petty (1996) asked participants to rate their 
subjective felt ambivalence on a certain topic on an II-point scale ranging from (0) feeling no 
conflict at all to (10) maximum conflict. Jamieson (1993, c.f. Connor & Sparks, 2002) measured 
the experience of feeling tom or conflicted using their simultaneous ambivalence scale (SIMAS) 
which contains four questions: two of which refer to the experience of conflict between cognitive 
elements (for example, I am not at all confused about abortion, I have strong thoughts about it and 
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I have easily made up my mind in one way), two refer to conflict between affective elements (e,g, 
I do not find myself feeling torn about the two sides of abortion, my feelings go in one direction 
only) and two cross the modality of cognition and affect (e.g. my head and heart seem to be in 
disagreement about the issue of abortion). The six questions are combined to form an 
ambivalence score. Priester and Petty's (1996) measure of ambivalence is similar to that of Elliot 
and Devine's (1994) cognitive dissonance thermometer, whereby people are also asked to report 
on their subjective feelings of discomfort or tension. Harmon-Jones and Mills (1999) have 
pointed out that such assessments explore ambivalence in terms of targeted dissonance around a 
particular attitude object, whilst in dissonance research discomfort is normally assessed on a 
global level (e.g. how uncomfortable do you feel right now?). 
The other most commonly utilised approach involves measurements of what has been 
termed 'potential ambivalence'. This employs separate measures of the positive and negative 
thoughts, feelings and beliefs that an attitude object produces. The positive and negative reactions 
measured are then combined to yield a continuous measure of ambivalence. The first indirect or 
formula based measure was developed by Kaplan (1972) using a modified semantic differential 
technique. He separately assessed the positive and negative attitudes attributed to an attitude 
object using different measures. A formula then produced an overall measure of ambivalence. 
Numerous other formulae have been developed, guided by Kaplan's suggestion that such scores 
should escalate as the positive and negative judgements become more polarised and similar in 
absolute value (Connor & Armitage in press). 
Measures of felt and potential ambivalence both have particular strengths and 
weaknesses. Although measures of felt ambivalence tap into an actual experience, it is not clear 
to what extent the relevant information on which such judgements are made are actually 
accessible to the individual. Differences may also occur in the way ambivalence is interpreted 
(Connor & Sparks, 2002). A further problem is the extent to which participants are able to focus 
on positive and negative attributes sequentially, with no interference on the judgements. 
Simultaneous Accessibility 
The cognitive dissonance and ambivalence paradigms both hold that the inconsistent-
related discomfort is moderated by the simultaneous accessibility of contradictory cognitions. 
However, unlike the cognitive dissonance literature in which the salience of inconsistent 
cognitions is manipulated but not measured, the literature on ambivalence provides a direct \\'ay of 
assessing the simultaneous awareness of inconsistencies using a technique developed by Bassilli 
(1996) measuring the length of time it takes a person to respond to unipolar evaluation questions. 
The response latencies are then introduced into a formula to obtain a simultaneous accessibility 
score. High latencies for evaluation questions have been shown to be associated with high 
28 
potential ambivalence (Bassili, 1998), with the relationship between response latencies and 
potential ambivalence more pronounced for those whose contradictory eyaluations are relatively 
high in simultaneous accessibility. 
To test the hypothesis that simultaneous accessibility moderates ambiyalence. Newby-
Clark, Zanna and McGregor (2002), in a series of studies, examined the impact of simultaneous 
accessibility on the relationship between felt and potential ambivalence. The studies used the 
same measures of potential and felt ambivalence, following Kaplan's (1972) method of asking 
participants three pairs of questions (positive and negative) about each issue. Simultaneous 
accessibility was measured using the response latency method. Participants who reported highly 
conflicting evaluations indicated that they experienced more ambivalence when their evaluations 
came to mind quickly and equally. Newby-Clark and colleagues (2002) hypothesis that 
simultaneous accessibility of inconsistent evaluations would moderate the relationship between 
potential and felt ambivalence was confirmed across both attitude objects, and they also found that 
it causes the relationship to be more pronounced. Newby-Clark et aI., also manipulated 
accessibility through rehearsal of expressions of an attitude, which was found to increase 
accessibility and to be associated with felt ambivalence. 
These findings, in combination with distraction and attention research from the cognitive 
dissonance paradigm, illustrates the importance of simultaneous accessibility of inconsistent 
cognitive elements as a factor in influencing inconsistency related discomfort but is not evidence 
that this alone can account for dissonance effects. Both research paradigms have illustrated the 
multifactorial nature of such discomfort. Newby-Clark et ai., (2002) suggest that cognitive 
dissonance experiments implicitly if not explicitly render cognitions more accessible. They argue 
that inconsistent cognitions may typically be low in simultaneous accessibility in the real world 
given the psychologically aversive nature of such inconsistency. 
Connor and Armitage (in press) suggest that the elicitors of ambivalence can be divided 
into two categories, top down and bottom up. Top down includes persistent tendencies such as 
value conflict or individual psychological differences. The bottom up category is concerned with 
environmental features such as the attitude object itself. They argue that the experience of 
ambi valence is influenced by exposure to di fferent types of bottom up processes such as 
presentation of conflict information and exposure to different social groups prompting conflict 
with societal values. Support for the impact of top down processes is less promising and the idea 
that value conflicts can create ambivalence has not been substantiated. 
Central to the theory of cognitive dissonance is the idea that inconsistency-related 
discomfort leads to motivation to reduce this unpleasant experience. The ambivalence and closely 
related attitude paradigm provide a broader understanding of ambivalence. Ambivalence has been 
evaluated in terms of how it affects the temporal stability and pliability of attitudes. information 
processing and the relationship of attitudes to behaviour (Connor & Sparks 2002: Connor & 
Armitage, in press). It is proposed that high ambivalence is associated with low attitude stability 
and vice versa. Although this is supported by larger scale surveys on political attitudes. other 
research has produced mixed findings. Connor and Armitage (in press) also suggest that 
ambivalent attitudes are more susceptible to the influence of external communication and have 
provided support for this in a study that influenced attitudes to diet in a high ambivalence group. 
Cognitive-affective Ambivalence 
Ambivalence can occur both between (i.e. inter-component) and within (intra-component) 
the three components of an attitude: beliefs, thoughts and feelings. A person might hold a positive 
thought and a negative thought about an attitude object (intra-component ambivalence). 
Alternatively someone might feel positively towards an attitude object but also have a belief 
which is negative (inter-component ambivalence). This idea of inter and intra-component 
inconsistencies is also evident in cognitive dissonance theory. Dissonance related discomfort can 
be caused by inconsistencies between or within the components the term cognition encompasses, 
such as behaviours, beliefs or perceptions. Both paradigms also argue that components should 
have similar valence and be at least moderately positively correlated (Lavine et al., 1998). This 
aspect of inconsistency theory has not however been examined in the dissonance literature. 
Evidence has accumulated in the ambivalence literature supporting the existence of 
inconsistent affective and cognitive evaluations of an attitude object (Cacioppo. Gardner & 
Bernston, 1997; Zaller, 1992, McDonald et ai., 1998; Maio, 1997; Maio, 2000). Attitude research 
has also demonstrated that cognition and affect are distinct components of attitude and that they 
are highly correlated. Measures of felt and potential ambivalence have been developed which tap 
into both cognitive-cognitive ambivalence and cognitive-affective ambivalence. Measures of 
potential ambivalence ask participants to report both their thoughts and feelings towards an 
attitude object. Measures of felt ambivalence tend to ask participants to give their subjective view 
as to how conflicted they feel their thoughts and feelings are (e.g. Jamieson 1993). The majority 
of ambivalence research has, however. focused on inter-component ambivalence, and has not 
considered the impact intra-component ambivalence may have on the conclusions reached. 
Connor and Armitage (in press) have suggested that this may be responsible for the variation in 
findings across studies. 
Lavine et al., (1998) hypothesised that when a person experiences conflicting thoughts and 
feelings they tend to rely on their emotional reactions to an attitude object rather than their beliefs to 
determine their overall attitude and attitude relevant behaviour. In contrast, when a person's 
thoughts and feelings are consistent their emotional reactions and beliefs exert roughly the same 
effect on their attitudes and behaviour. This was coined the Ambivalence Related Primacy of A/j('ct 
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hypothesis and was based on research suggesting that: a) affective responses may often 
chronologically precede cognitive responses in attitude formation; b) affective responses may be 
perceived more selectively-biased and more related to the self and; c) affective information may be 
more easily retrieved from memory than that which is cognitive. 
Testing this hypothesis Lavine et at., (1998) used national survey data and voting 
behaviour from four different election years. The interviews included items which assessed 
emotions engendered by the candidates (affect), beliefs about the candidate's domain relevant 
personal qualities (cognition), overall candidate evaluations (attitude), and reported voting 
behaviour. This enabled the investigation of the relative impact of feelings (e.g. pride) and beliefs 
(e.g. leadership) held by respondents on their overall attitudes and voting behaviour. The 
respondents were classified as having ambivalent affective-cognitive structures towards the given 
candidate, or univalent cognitive-affective structures. Strong support was provided for their 
hypothesis. In the ambivalent group affect significantly influenced attitude and behaviour over 
cognition in 18 out of 38 comparisons. In contrast cognition only significantly outweighed affect in 
1 of the 38 cases. In the univalent group affect and cognition exerted very similar affects on both 
attitudes and behaviour. 
Ambivalence, Cognitive Dissonance and MI 
This chapter will now explore the extent to which current cognitive dissonance and 
ambivalence theories could improve understanding of the mechanisms of change in MI. It is 
evident from the review above that although these two literatures remain largely unintegrated, they 
share many common theoretical attributes. It is important that prior to considering these two 
discrepancy-related theories in the context of MI that an overview of the similarities and differences 
are provided (see Table 3). Newby-Clark et at., (2002) also emphasise the overlapping nature of 
cognitive dissonance and ambivalence. They propose that despite their differing methodologies and 
foci, they are remarkably similar and share many functional roots. They suggest that together the 
two theories can provide a more complete picture than the two can offer separately. 
Central to cognitive dissonance and ambivalence theory is the existence of conflicting 
cognitions which are moderated to induce an experience of psychological tension. The 
inconsistencies can be experienced within or between cognitions, which can be held towards a 
range of objects. A moderating variable proposed to induce the experience of inconsistent-related 
discomfort in both literatures is the simultaneous accessibility of inconsistent cognitions. Cogniti ve 
dissonance is a broader theory which encompasses a wide range of cognitions. whereas 
ambivalence focuses on attitudes. Although both paradigms study the consequences of 
inconsistent-related discomfort. their focus and conclusions differ. Cognitive dissonance argues 
that once psychological tension is induced a motivation to achieve cognitive consistency is 
experienced. Ambivalence theory focuses on the impact this experience has upon attitudes and 
behaviour, concluding that the more intense the ambivalent experience, the less stable and more 
pliable attitudes. A principal difference between these two discrepancy-related theories is the 
methodology used in their examination. Although both literatures have utilised observational and 
self-report methodologies, cognitive dissonance predominantly consists of observational studies 
examining the behavioural and cognitive consequences of this experience. Ambivalence 
researchers have primarily utilised self-report questionnaires asking participants to either 
subjectively rate their ambivalence experience or provide their positive and negative evaluations 
towards an attitude object. Cognitive dissonance research investigating the role of the simultaneous 
accessibility of inconsistent cognitions in moderating inconsistent-related discomfort does not 
directly measure either experience. Ambivalence researchers adopt a measure which directly 
assesses simultaneous accessibility. 
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Table 3: Similarities and Differences of Cognitive Dissonance and Ambiyalence 
Aspect 
Cognitive 
inconsistencies 
Cogni tions/ eval uati ons 
held towards objects 
Inconsistent -related 
discomfort 
Variables moderating 
inconsistent-related 
discomfort 
Cognitive Dissonance Ambivalence 
Involve the experience of cognitive inconsistencies 
Encompasses a broad range of 
cognitions: thoughts, feelings. 
beliefs, perceptions, 
behaviours, goals, values or 
indeed any piece of 
knowledge one may have 
Encompasses a more specific range of 
cognitions: attitudes the components 
of which include thoughts, feelings 
and beliefs 
Cognitions or evaluations can be held towards a range of objects: 
people, places, things, oneself, events 
Cognitions can be held within Evaluations are focused upon a 
or between objects specific attitude object 
Involve the experience of psychological affect, conflict or tension 
Few studies measure the 
actual feeling of 
psychological discomfort. 
When it has been measured 
participants are asked to 
report their global experience 
of conflict or tension. 
The direct measurement of 
ambivalence is a central component 
of its research .. 
In addition to differentiating between 
inconsistent cognitions and 
inconsistent related discomfort a 
distinction is made between felt and 
potential ambivalence. 
Measures of potential ambivalence 
ask participants to report their 
inconsistent cognitions and a formula 
is used to estimate the felt 
ambivalence experienced. 
In measures of felt ambivalence 
participants report the extent in which 
they feel conflict or tension due to 
inconsistent evaluation towards an 
attitude object. 
Many variables have been found to moderate the experience of 
inconsistent cognitions and inconsistent related discomfort 
Aversive consequences, 
foreseeability of aversive 
consequences, preference for 
consistency, simultaneous 
accessibility, freedom to 
choose your behaviour and a 
commitment towards that 
behaviour 
Individual differences, such as 
personality style and value conflict, 
preference for consistency, 
simultaneous accessibility 
Aspect 
S imul taneous 
accessibility 
Consequences of 
inconsistent -related 
discomfort 
Research 
Methodology 
Cognitive Dissonance Ambivalence 
The simultaneous accessibility or awareness of inconsistent cognitions 
have been found to moderate the experience of psychological 
discomfort associated with them. 
Studies are observational in A method has been adopted to 
nature and simultaneous direct I y measure a person's 
awareness is not directly simultaneous accessibility of their 
measured. inconsistent cognitions. 
The consequences of experiencing inconsistent related discomfort have 
been studied 
Central to the theory of CD is 
the idea that once inconsistent 
related discomfort is induced 
a motivation or inherent drive 
to resolve this discomfort is 
experienced. 
The impact of ambivalence on 
attitudes, intentions and behaviours 
has been investigated. In general the 
high ambivalence is associated with 
decreased stability and increased 
pliability of attitudes. 
Observational and self report research methodologies are used. 
Research predomi natel y 
consists of observational 
studies. 
Research predominately consists of 
self report studies. 
Cognitive Dissonance and MI 
The first ever description of M1 and exploration of its potential processes (Miller. 1982. c.f. 
Mint Bulletin, 2008; Miller 1983) proposed cognitive dissonance as a fundamental concept. Miller 
argued that a primary goal in M1 is to elicit and magnify a dissonance experience within the client. 
acknowledging the various cognitions encompassed in the cognitive dissonance construct (e.g. 
behaviour, beliefs, attitudes and feelings). The discrepancy which can exist between behaviour and 
other cognitions, or present state of affairs and broader goals and values are emphasised. Miller 
proposed that the principles and techniques of MI can be used to magnify the dissonant state by 
adding new cognitions to the person's repertoire which are inconsistent with their behaviour. 
Congruent with the cognitive dissonance paradigm, Miller hypothesised that once inconsistencies 
are elicited an inherent motivational drive to achieve cognitive consistency will be experienced. 
Consistency can be achieved in the direction towards behaviour change or away from behaviour 
change. Cognitions may be modified to support behaviour change or the behaviour itself may be 
altered; alternatively cognitions may be modified to support status quo. The second task of the MI 
therapist is therefore to intervene in a way which increases the probability that behaviour change 
will be used to reduce cognitive dissonance, rather than the alteration of cognitive structures. 
Two methods recognised in the cognitive dissonance literature for achieving cognitive 
consistency in the direction away from behaviour change: denial and low self-efficacy/self-esteem, 
are identified by Miller. A person may modify their cognitions through minimising or trivialising 
their problems or the need to change their behaviour. They may add cognitions to their repertoire 
associated with low self-efficacy such as, "I cannot give up drinking" or "I haven't got it in me to 
give up". Low self-esteem and self-regard can enable a person to view their self destructive 
behaviour as understandable and therefore of no consequence. 
Miller further emphasises the importance in MI of awareness building or consciousness 
raising of a person's cognitions. Miller placed particular emphasis on the importance of positioning 
awareness weights on the end of the balance favouring change. The client is actively engaged in 
increasing the awareness of these cognitions, or what is referred to as self-motivational statements. 
Miller and Rollnick (1991; 2002) later revised their original proposition that cognitive 
dissonance is fundamental to MI. Rather, they emphasise the importance of eliciting a discrepancy 
between a person's state of affairs and broader goals and values. Their revision is based on the 
hypothesis that when inconsistencies are elicited in M1 the client does not in fact experience a 
motivational drive to achieve consistency, as predicted by cognitive dissonance. Instead. it is 
proposed that a discrepancy between behaviour and broader goals and values directly intluences the 
elicitation of ambivalence towards changing behaviour. Such discrepancies influence the 
importance placed on changing behaviour with larger discrepancies gaining greater importance. It 
is argued that when a person's behaviour conflicts deeply held values, their behaviour tends to be 
the cognition that changes. It is thought that as a person's discrepancy between their actual and 
ideal increases their ambivalence intensifies. Their ambivalent state can subsequently be resolved in 
the direction of change. 
Draycott and Dabbs (1998) contest Miller and Rollnick's revised theory, providing an 
outline for how specific aspects of MI may lead to cognitive dissonance and subsequent behaviour 
change. For example, they highlight how expressing empathy, developing discrepancy, avoiding 
arguments, rolling with resistance and supporting self-efficacy can increase a client's awareness 
of inconsistent cognitions, inducing an experience of cognitive dissonance. They also illustrate 
how these principles can be used to reinforce attempts made by the client to reduce their cognitive 
dissonance in the direction of change, and respond to attempts made to reduce dissonance in the 
direction away from change. Draycott and Dabbs conclude that their success in this mapping 
process provides support for the usefulness of cognitive dissonance in enhancing understanding of 
the processes underlying MI. Insights from this theory are used to make recommendations for 
improving the application of MI such as using a visual record to keep cognitive inconsistency 
salient and in the mind. 
One empirical study has tested the hypothesis regarding clients' experience of cognitive 
dissonance and a discrepancy between the actual and ideal as a mechanism of change in MI 
(McNally, Palfai & Kahler, 2005). McNally et ai., (2005) examined the occurrence of 
discrepancy-related psychological processes in an MI-based intervention for 73 heavy drinking 
undergraduate students. Clients' experience of a discrepancy between their actual and ideal 
drinking behaviour and two forms of cognitive dissonance (general affective discomfort; negative, 
self-focused affects) during the intervention was investigated using self report measures and 
associations with reduction in alcohol consumption examined. Actual-ideal and negative self-
focused affect discrepancy-related processes significantly increased following the MI-based 
intervention. They also significantly correlated with reduction in alcohol consumption. General 
discomfort-related dissonance affects did not increase during the intervention or relate to outcome. 
The authors propose that the significance of self-focused affect and lack of association with more 
general affective discomfort is consistent with Elliott and Devine's (1994) suggestion that the 
affect experienced may be largely influenced by the self-relevance of the cognition which is 
threatened. This study is limited in generalisability due to participants being undergraduate 
students. The short follow-up period of six weeks also questions the sustainability of these 
findings. 
Miller's original description of the role of cognitive dissonance in MI captures many 
aspects of dissonance theory. He acknowledges: a) the wide array of cognitions encompassed in 
this construct: b) the discrepancies which can occur bet\veen a person's behaviour and their other 
cognitions: c) the motivational drive a person experiences to achieve cognitive consistency: d) two 
methods used to achieve cognitive consistency in the direction away from change (denial and low 
self efficacy) and; e) the importance of increasing the awareness of cognitions. Other aspects are not 
explicitly mentioned. 
Aspects of Cognitive Dissonance not Captured in MI 
The following aspects of the original dissonance paradigm. its revisions and developments. 
do not appear to have been described or explicitly referred to in the MI literature: a) the \\'ide array 
of inter and intra-component inconsistencies experienced; b) the psychological tension inherent in 
the dissonance experience; c) the distinction between inconsistent cognitions and inconsistent 
related discomfort; d) the variables proposed to moderate the experience of psychological tension. 
particularly the simultaneous accessibility of cognitions; and e) the importance of the self in the 
dissonance experience. In addition, the MI literature has not considered how cognitive dissonance 
research paradigms such as belief disconfirmation could enhance the understanding of Mrs 
motivational processes. The gap between the cognitive dissonance and MI literatures are now 
discussed in more detail. 
Cognitive Inconsistencies 
Cognitive dissonance encompasses a wide range of cognitions and combinations of inter 
and intra-component cognitive inconsistencies (Festinger, 1957). In addition to developing a 
discrepancy between a person's behaviour and their other cognitions or between their actual and 
ideal, as emphasised by Miller and Rollnick, MI may enable a person to become aware of other 
types of intra-component (e.g. inconsistent behaviour, inconsistent thoughts) and inter-component 
(e.g. inconsistent thoughts and feelings) cognitive inconsistencies. It may be that the elicitations of 
these alternative discrepancies also underlie the motivational processes of MI, as according to 
cognitive dissonance literature, they all have the potential to result in inconsistent-related 
discomfort and a motivation to achieve consistency. 
Inconsistent-related Discomfort 
Central to cognitive dissonance is the experience of psychological tension or inconsistent-
related discomfort (Elliott & Devine, 1994). The MI literature does not appear to explicitly refer to 
this experience of negative affect, nor distinguish between the experience of conflicting cognitions 
and inconsistent-related discomfort. Research investigating the variables moderating this 
experience (Cooper, 2007) could be utilised to inform how Mrs principles and techniques can be 
used to induce cognitive dissonance discomfort. Inadvertently. MI endeavours to meet two 
conditions which are deemed necessary in the social psychology literature to induce inconsistent-
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related discomfort: freedom to choose behaviour (Linder et al., 1967) and the forseeability of 
aversive consequences (Cooper, 1968). MI's style, principles and techniques are used to provide a 
space whereby the client can be helped to make a decision about what they want to do about their 
behaviour. Freedom to choose is emphasised throughout the treatment. Clients are also actively 
engaged in becoming more aware of the negative and aversive consequences of their behaviour. 
These motivational processes are not aligned to, or discussed in context of cognitive dissonance, 
however. The dissonance formula developed by Festinger (1957) may also provide insight into 
how MI can elicit inconsistent-related discomfort. The clinician should not only introduce new 
cognitions which are discrepant from one another into the client's repertoire, but also increase the 
importance of the discrepant cognitions. 
An important variable shown to moderate the experience of inconsistent-related discomfort 
is the simultaneous accessibility of inconsistent cognitions. Although Miller (1983) identifies the 
need to increase the awareness of cognitions, he limits his focus to those favouring change. A 
fundamental aspect involved in eliciting cognitive dissonance may be increasing the simultaneous 
accessibility of a person's inconsistent cognitions associated with their target behaviour. 
Consideration of the distinction between inconsistent-related discomfort raises the following 
questions which could aid our understanding of the active ingredients involved in MI: 
Do clients attending MI experience inconsistent-related discomfort? 
Is the experience of inconsistent-related discomfort important in the therapeutic processes of 
MI? 
If so, what variables could MI moderate to elicit and magnify this experience? 
At what stage of MI treatment is this experience most likel y to occur? 
Miller and Rollnick's (2002) revised hypothesis emphasizing the importance of developing a 
discrepancy between a person's actual and ideal rather than cognitive dissonance, not only avoids 
an inherent drive to achieve cognitive consistency, but infers that a person is merely experiencing a 
discrepancy rather than inconsistent-related discomfort. This indicates Miller and Rollnick may be 
at risk of having 'thrown the baby out with the bath water' when they dismissed cognitive 
dissonance as an importance process in MI. 
The Importance of the Self 
Cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) and self-discrepancy (Higgins, 1969) theories 
suggest conflicting cognitions can be held towards oneself. Revisions of cognitive dissonance 
theory, such as self-affirmation, self-consistency and the self-standard model (Cooper. 2007), 
provide useful insights into how the self influences the production and reduction of the dissonanc~ 
experience. Such theories could help us understand potential ways the self may be important in the 
process of MI. In addition to developing a person's discrepancy between their present state and 
where they would like to be, and eliciting their ambivalent attitude towards their target behaviour. 
MI's techniques and principles may also increase the availability and awareness of inconsistencies 
between cognitions towards themselves, or between their behaviour and sense of self as a moral and 
integral person or the standards they set for themselves. The clinician can produce and magnify a 
dissonant state by asking questions about, listening to, reflecting upon and summarising client 
language, indicating importance of the self. When attempting to reduce self related dissonance in 
the direction of behaviour change, the clinician may note and respond to any attempt made to 
reduce dissonance in the direction of status quo. A person's self-integrity may be threatened when 
they see themselves as moral, yet get drunk and assault partners, for example. They might try to 
reduce their discomfort by telling themselves that they were provoked, or buy their partner flowers. 
The clinician could help to reverse this strategy by actively engaging the client in becoming more 
aware of how their behaviour contradicts their views of themselves as moral and integral people. It 
could be argued that the possibility of the client altering their cognitions to support behaviour 
change would then increase. 
Impact of the Provision of New and Conflicting Cognitions 
A technique commonly incorporated into MI is the feedback of various assessments the 
client completes regarding their target behaviour (Miller & Rollnick, 2002). The purpose of such 
feedback is to inform the client about ways the target behaviour negatively affects their lives. 
Information is gathered about such things as the extent to which they are dependant on their 
behaviour, the problems which have arisen due to their behaviour, and the psychological and 
physical effects of that behaviour. The role of the majority of MI's principles and techniques in 
eliciting ambivalence is to listen to, encourage the discussion of and reflect upon a person's 
cognitions and the inconsistencies within them. The process of feedback differs in that the clinician 
is providing information which may add new cognitions to the client's repertoire. The paradigm of 
belief disconfirmation from cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) can help us understand the 
process which may occur when feedback is provided. Similar to the scenarios adopted in early 
dissonance research (Festinger et al., 1956), in such situations the client is being presented with 
information which may be discrepant with many of their cognitions, thereby increasing the 
magnitude of inconsistent-related discomfort experienced. Alternatively such information 
regarding the negative effects of their behaviour may already, at some leveL be available to a 
person. They may, however, have used techniques such as distraction, trivialisation or repression to 
minimise the accessibility of such cognitions. 
The belief disconfirmation paradigm posits that when a person is provided with information 
inconsistent with their cognitions, and dissonance is aroused, an attempt is made to resolve it 
(Festinger et al., 1956). When feedback is provided in MI a similar process may occur. Once a 
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client's inconsistent-related discomfort is increased they may attempt to resolve it by trivialising or 
distracting themselves from their new cognitions. For example, a person may say. "the feedback I 
was given was not accurate", distract themselves from thinking about the information they were 
given or add new cognitions, such as, "my friends drink as much as I do and they are ok". The aim 
of the clinician should therefore be to pay attention to and recognise the use of such methods to 
resolve dissonance. They endeavour to provide feedback in a way which allows clients to integrate 
this new information into their broader cognitions and more specific attitudes, the primary purpose 
being to increase language in the direction of change, and ultimately, behaviour change. 
Ambivalence and MI 
Hypothesised Processes 
The concept of ambivalence has been integral to the development of MI and an 
understanding of its mechanisms of action. Unlike cognitive dissonance, however, the elicitation 
and resolution of ambivalence towards changing target behaviour continues to be seen as central to 
the process of MI. Miller and Rollnick (2002) regard ambivalence as a normal aspect of human 
nature, and a natural phase in the process of change. They propose that problems can persist and 
intensify when a person gets stuck in an ambivalent state. The aim of MI is to help people get 
unstuck from this ambivalent experience and enable them to move towards a decision which 
supports change. The metaphor of a balance or seesaw is used to illustrate ambivalence. Weights 
are placed on each side, whereby one side represents the perceived benefits of a particular course of 
action and the other represents the perceived costs. The ambivalent experience is referred to as 
confusing, perplexing and frustrating. The MISe 2.l (Miller et al., 2008; Amhrein et al., 2003), 
developed to code client language indicating a move towards or away from change, is seen as being 
able to capture client language representing ambivalence. Ambivalence is noted to be expressed 
when 'change' and 'sustain' talk occurs in the same volley (e.g. "I really enjoy drinking, but I have 
to give it up for my kids.") 
Ambivalence was recently explored in an MI seminar (Nasholm, 2007) in which MI 
practitioners debated the question, "what is ambivalence"? This elicited the following responses: a 
natural human state with different possibilities for understanding and action; a state of openness and 
opportunity; a capacity to see, understand and cope with ambiguity: an important stage in the 
change process, when a person starts and hopefully continues to explore the possibility of change. 
It was proposed that models of ambivalence provide maps which enable people to find their way out 
of complicated uncertainty, inviting them to take a step back and see themsel ves from an outside 
perspective, whereby they enter into a psychological state of self observation and sci f confrontation. 
It is argued that exploring ambivalence is a process whereby a person is helped to explore and re-
evaluate themselves, situations and the possibility of change. 
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Leffingwell et ai., (2006) attempted to narrow the gap between the social psychological 
conceptualisations of ambivalence and the implications for the theoretical understanding of \11. 
Particular reference is made to cognitive-affective ambivalence. Leffingwell et al., (2006) 
highlights how ambivalence can exist in terms of how one thinks (cognitive) and how one feels 
(affective) and that interplay can exist between them. This was demonstrated in a study of 
smokers dependent on nicotine (Trafimow & Sheeran, 1998). Consistent with findings from other 
domains, affective beliefs were found to be more strongly associated with overall attitudes and 
intentions than cognitive beliefs. Leffingwell and colleagues (2006) speculate that different types 
of client CT associated with cognitive and affective beliefs may vary in their relationship with 
behaviour change. They recommend that clinicians pay particular attention to the cognitive-
affective content of CT, both towards change and status quo. They propose differentiating 
cognitive and affective beliefs and language and assessing their influence on commitment 
language and outcome. 
Two empirical studies have tested the hypothesis regarding clients' experience of 
ambivalence as mechanism of change in MI (Armitage, Povey & Arden, 2003; Armitage & 
Arden, in press). Armitage and colleagues (2003; in press) evaluated the relationship between 
ambivalence and the stages of change defined in the transtheoretical model (TTM) (Prochaska & 
DiClemente, 1983). Both studies involved a cross-sectional design. Questionnaires were used to 
measure stage of change and ambivalence. The TTM consists of five stages of change 
representing different levels of motivation (pre-contemplation, contemplation, preparation, action 
and maintenance) with movement through these stages viewed as non-linear; individuals are 
thought to move forward and backwards through the stages as they decide whether or not to 
change their behaviour. Armitage et al., (2003) found a quadratic relationship to exist between 
potential ambivalence and stages of change. Participants in the beginning (pre-contemplation) or 
end (maintenance) stages showed least attitudinal ambivalence. Participants in the middle stages 
(contemplation, preparation and action) were significantly more ambivalent. Expanding on this, 
they evaluated the relationship of potential and felt ambivalence across the stages of change. The 
same quadratic relationship was found with both types of ambivalence and stage of change. Least 
ambivalence occurred in the pre-contemplation and maintenance stages. The majority of 
ambivalence occurred in the preparation stage. Felt and potential ambivalence were only 
modestly correlated and were mostly correlated in the action and maintenance stages, consistent 
with the authors' hypothesis. Armitage and colleagues (2006) propose that according to 
principles of MI, actors and maintainers have succeeded in recognizing and dealing with 
ambivalence and are engaging in desired health behaviour. They are at more risk of potential 
relapse and are on a daily basis trying to deal with conflict, hence the close correspondence with 
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potential and felt ambivalence. This evidence provides support for the importance of ambivalence 
in promoting progression through the stages of change. 
Armitage and Arden conclude that the non-linear relationship bet\veen ambivalence and 
the stages of change supports Miller and Rollnick's (2002) hypothesis that MI creates and 
amplifies a discrepancy between present behaviour and broader goals in the clients' mind, before 
encouraging action to resolve the ambivalence. They provide preliminary evidence to support the 
hypothesis that ambivalence is a key factor in the process of MI though the research did not study 
the process of MI itself, and is limited by sample (undergraduates) and behaviour (diet). Research 
is needed exploring how ambivalence actually occurs and progresses during MI to substantiate the 
theory that ambivalence is an active ingredient in effecting change. 
The following aspects of the social psychology conceptualisation of ambivalence are 
clearly referred to by MI clinicians and researchers: a) the idea that a person can experience 
conflicting evaluations towards changing their behaviour; b) ambivalence can be elicited through 
increasing the awareness of these evaluations; and c) it is associated with an experience of 
negative affect, described as frustration. 
Aspects of Ambivalence Not Captured in MI 
An in-depth exploration of ambivalence research within the context of MI highlights gaps 
between the ambivalence and MI literatures which, if narrowed, could inform discussions 
regarding the definition of ambivalence. Due to the shared characteristics of ambivalence and 
cognitive dissonance constructs, the gaps outlined between these two theories and MI overlap. 
The following attributes of ambivalence theory do not appear to be depicted in MI: a) although 
ambivalence is associated with an experience of frustration, the psychological tension inherent in 
its occurrence is not overtly referred to; b) the experience of inconsistent cognitions and felt 
ambivalence are not distinguished from each other; c) although recognised anecdotally in many 
accounts of MI, for example, in clients describing a conflict between their head and heart in their 
attitude to drinking, a distinction between the different components of attitudes (thoughts, feelings 
and beliefs) and the inter and intra-component inconsistencies experienced, are not explicitly 
made; and d) the consequences of ambivalence identified in social psychology research are not 
described. The first two aspects identified overlap with the gaps between cognitive dissonance 
and MI and have already been discussed in the cognitive dissonance and MI section of this 
chapter. The latter two aspects are specific to ambivalence theory and are discussed in more detail 
below. 
Cognitive-affective Ambivalence 
As outlined by Leffingwell et al., (2006) a form of ambivalence is cognitive-affective 
ambivalence (Lavine et al., 1996), whereby a person experiences inconsistent thoughts and feelings 
towards a target behaviour. Although recognised anecdotally in many accounts of MI. a distinction 
is not explicitly made in the MI literature. A person may get much enjoyment from drinking 
alcohol yet recognise the destructive effect it is having on their physical body; may think of how 
taking cocaine enables them to spend time with their friends, however. not like the negative feelings 
it leaves them with the following week. Research indicates that when cognitive-affective 
ambivalence is experienced feelings towards an attitude object override thoughts when determining 
the direction in which ambivalence is resolved (Lavine et al., 1996). Findings also suggest that this 
relationship is more pronounced when feelings towards an attitude object are positivc and thoughts 
negative. Integration of such findings into the MI literature could enhance understanding of the role 
of ambivalence. An important aspect of the clinician's role may be to listen for, and make note of, 
the client's thoughts and feelings towards changing their target behaviour. The language the 
clinician uses may also be important when considering how to elicit this type of ambivalence. The 
effectiveness ofMI could be improved by eliciting cognitive-affective ambivalence and resolving 
this ambivalence in the direction of change by decreasing a person's positive feelings towards their 
target behaviour and increasing their negative feelings, for example, "it makes me feel ashamed" or 
"drinking makes me feel depressed." 
Consequences of Ambivalence 
Research investigating the consequences of ambivalence (Connor & Armitage, in press) 
supports the idea that, before the clinician attempts to change a client's attitude in the positive 
direction of change, their attitudinal ambivalence must first be elicited. It has been found that the 
higher a person's ambivalence, the less stable and more pliable their attitudes. This indicates that 
the more intense a client's experience of ambivalence regarding changing their behaviour, the more 
effective the clinician will be in influencing their attitudes in the direction of change. 
Summary & Conclusions 
The development and ongoing investigation of cognitive dissonance and ambivalence in the 
social psychology literature provide insight into the experience of inconsistent cognitions and the 
psychological tension associated with them, how they are elicited and the consequenccs associated 
with their occurrence. Although these two discrepancy-related concepts for the most part remain 
un-integrated, they share many theoretical attributes. Their overlapping components, in 
combination with their differing research methodology and foci. enable cognitive dissonance and 
ambivalence theories to be used together to inform and complement one another and provide a more 
complete picture of discrepancy-related processes. Cognitive dissonance and ambivalence theory 
have been referred to as potential motivational processes within MI; ambivalence has consistently 
been viewed as an integral experience, whilst cognitive dissonance has been more recently 
dismissed and replaced by the idea of developing a discrepancy between a person's actual and ideal. 
Research has not directly investigated the occurrence of ambivalence in MI, and only one study has 
been conducted examining cognitive dissonance and a discrepancy between a person's actual and 
ideal as important processes of change. Descriptions of the occurrence of these discrepancy-relakd 
concepts in MI capture many of their theoretical attributes. An in-depth consideration of the 
distinct qualities of each theory and their overlapping components highlight gaps between the social 
psychology and MI literatures. Together they provide a discrepancy-related model for 
understanding the motivational processes occurring in clients attending MI. 
Ambivalence seems to be relevant to an understanding of the process of change engendered 
in MI, but it is also too early to reject cognitive dissonance as a potentially useful concept. Few 
studies have utilised these models in interpreting process data from MI. In particular, MI 
researchers have generally not referenced the recent developments in how ambivalence and 
cognitive dissonance have been conceptualized and measured in the social psychology literature, 
and it is argued that they may both have much to offer to an understanding of how motivation is 
influenced by MI. 
Current Study 
Rationale and Aims 
Eliciting and resolving ambivalence is a key aim of MI. It has been suggested that it is 
crucial in enhancing motivation and producing behaviour change. Other constructs such as 
cognitive dissonance, discrepancies between the actual and the ideal. and decision-making are 
also referred to in the MI literature and thought to be important in the change process, though the 
nature of the relationship - if any - between these concepts and the process of MI remains 
undeveloped. A gap exists between the social psychology literature from which these constructs 
have arisen and the MI literature which frequently refers to them. There is little evidence at the 
moment to support or refute the hypothesis that they are important in the process of MI. The aims 
of this current study are to a) provide a more detailed conceptualisation of these constructs within 
the context of MI and b) explore ambivalence and its associated constructs as underlying 
mechanisms of change in MI through an examination of data from the United Kingdom Alcohol 
Treatment Trial (UKATT) (UKATT Research Team. 2001). 
Research Questions 
This thesis will ask the following questions: 
• How are cognitive dissonance and ambivalence expressed by clients in sessions of 
MI? 
• Does either cognitive dissonance or ambivalence, or both, more adequately 
capture the processes reflected in client language? 
CHAPTER 3: METHOD 
This chapter provides a summary of the UKATT study (UKATT Research Team, 2005). 
and the methods used in the current study to perform a secondary analysis of the UKAIT data to 
investigate ambivalence and cognitive dissonance as underlying mechanisms of change in MI. 
Summary of Primary Empirical Study 
The UKATT study evaluated the effectiveness of two forms of treatment for alcohol 
problems, MET and Social Network Behavioural Therapy (SBNT). The UKAIT design was a 
pragmatic randomised multi-centre trial. Participants were all receiving treatment for alcohol abuse 
at one of seven British addiction treatment centres. Exclusion criteria were age less than 16 years, 
illiteracy, unable to name a contact, intending to leave the area, psychosis or severe cognitive 
impairment, or already receiving treatment for an alcohol problem. Participants were randomly 
allocated to the two treatment conditions: SBNT consisted of eight 50 minute sessions over 8 - 12 
weeks; MET consisted of three 50 minute sessions over 8 - 12 weeks. A process rating scale was 
developed (UKATT, 2008) to measure specific and non-specific aspects of MET and SBNT. 
Therapist's language was coded to measure the frequency and quality of various aspects 
incorporated in both treatments. 
Therapists were trained in their allocated treatments through a course lasting three days. To 
achieve accreditation, the trainees had to complete the supervised treatment of one or two clients 
and show competence through video recordings. Therapists continued to record treatment sessions 
on video and to receive supervision to encourage compliance with their allocated manual. 
The main patient outcome measures were: Form 90 (Miller, 1996) that summarised the 
number of drinks per drinking day and percentage of days absent; Leeds Dependence 
Questionnaire (LDQ; Raistrick et al., 1994) measuring alcohol dependence; Alcohol Problems 
Questionnaire (APQ; Drummond, 1990) measuring alcohol related problems over the past three 
months; Y -glutamyl transference test, Refloftron (Manneheim, 1989) which measures liver 
functioning. Measures were completed pre-therapy, at 3 months and at 12 months. 
742 participants took part in the study, 442 in the MET arm and 320 in the SBNT arm. 
689 were interviewed at 3 months and 617 at 12 months, 442 and 393 of which were respectively 
treated with MET. MET and SBNT were equally effective, with reductions in alcohol 
consumption, dependence and problems being maintained over 12 months (UKATT Research 
Team, 2005). Further evaluation of their cost-effectiveness has also shown them to be equally 
acceptable (UKATT Research Team, 2005). Participants consented to the completion of future 
research utilising the information they provided in the original UKAIT study (Appendix 2), 
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Secondary Analysis 
The current study aimed to explore the expression of ambivalence and cognitive dissonance 
in routine MI sessions, and determine whether either model more adequately captures the processes 
reflected in client language. 
Design 
This study was a secondary, qualitative analysis of data collected in the MET arm of the 
UKA TT trial. 
Sample 
An opportunistic sample of 10 participants from the MET arm of the trial were selected. 
Procedure 
Consent to access video recordings of treatment sessions in addition to demographic and 
process data from the UKATT trial, were obtained from the primary investigators of UKATT study 
(see Appendix 3). Ethical committee (Appendix 4) and research and development approval 
(Appendix 5) was obtained. Transcripts of one videotaped session for each of the participants were 
obtained and subjected to analysis by the researcher. It was decided to focus on the initial session 
for each participant. The MET manual developed for the UKATT study instructs the therapist to 
focus on different tasks during each of the three sessions and it is reasonable to assume that 
differences may exist in the amount and way ambivalence is expressed as the intervention 
progresses. Session one was chosen for the analysis as the main aim during this first session was to 
elicit ambivalence, and an initial scrutiny of videotaped sessions indicated that client expressions of 
ambivalence appeared to occur more in the this session than the second and third. 
Method of Analysis 
(Russell) 1989 emphasises the key role of language plays in our world and therefore, 
instinctively, the delivery, and potentially, the effectiveness of "talk therapy". He proposes our 
knowledge of individual position in society is seriously incomplete unless we understand how 
language is utilised in significant social interaction and habitual constructions of self and social 
discourses. Exchanges between therapist and client occur primarily through the medium of 
language. Clinic material primarily consists of information regarding how clients construe 
themselves to the therapist through language. Russell highlighted the integral. theoretical 
relationship between psychotherapies defining concept and key language function and propos~s 
the use of language as a method for investigating the process of therapy is ultimately warranted. 
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The qualitative method used in this study was thematic analysis. Braun and Clarke (2006) 
define thematic analysis as "A method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) 
within data." (P .79). They argue that in addition to being a foundational method used in 
conducting many other forms of qualitative analysis, it should be considered a method in its own 
right. Unlike other qualitative methodologies such as Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis 
(lPA; Smith & Osbourne, 2003), and Grounded Theory (Straus & Crorben, 1998). thematic 
analysis is independent of any particular theoretical or epistemological positions which allows for 
flexibility in its application. Braun and Clarke (2006), argue that this theoretical freedom enables 
an analysis which can encompass any epistemological position of the researcher, specific or broad 
research questions, and provides a detailed yet complex account of the data. Given this flexibility 
of use, they recommend a clear outline of the researcher's methodology, theoretical and 
epistemological assumptions must be provided. 
The thematic analysis in this study took the following form: 
• It was theory led, guided by two theories of inconsistent -related discomfort: ambivalence 
and cognitive dissonance. In theory led thematic analysis the researcher begins with 
hypotheses based on theory of what may occur in the data, subsequently formulating signals 
or indicators, for evidence that may support this theory (Boyatzis 1998). 
• A semantic approach was adopted whereby the explicit or surface level meaning of the data 
was used to identify themes. 
• The cognitive dissonance and ambivalence literature was also used to guide the next, 
interpretive level of analysis. This aimed to infer the broader meanings and implications of 
the themes identified. 
• An essentialist/realist approach was used whereby motivation, experience and meaning are 
theorised in a straight forward way. 
• Themes were collated from the analysis of client language. Clinician language was also 
included when a broader context was required (as recommended by Braun and Clarke, 
2006). 
• The size of meaning units analysed were not predetermined but led by the data; they varied 
in size ranging from a single client utterance to a passage in the data set. 
Theoretical Background to the Analysis 
Ambivalence was defined as the simultaneous accessibility of inconsistent attitudes towards 
an attitude object. Thoughts, or what is referred to as cognitions. and feelings are two distinct 
components of attitudes. The elicitation of client's ambivalence towards a target behaviour is 
proposed to be key in the process of MI. Inter and intra-component ambivalence would therefore 
be expected to be expressed by the client during treatment (see Figure 1). Ambivalence can occur 
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within or between these components: cognitive - cognitive ambivalence, affective - affective 
ambivalence and cognitive - affective ambivalence. 
Cognitive Dissonance is also caused by the simultaneous accessibility of inconsistent 
cognitions. The term cognition is used to refer to a broad range of knowledge a person may hold. 
This knowledge can be held within or between various objects. In addition to attitudes the main 
cognitions MI focuses upon are clients' target behaviour, cognitions regarding their present state of 
affairs, and their broader goals and values. A proposed active ingredient is the elicitation of 
discrepancies between such cognitions. Client language representing inconsistencies in such 
cognitions would therefore be expected to be expressed during treatment. Inter-component 
inconsistencies between behaviour and thoughts, and behaviour and affect. and intra-component 
inconsistencies within behaviour would also be expected to occur (see Figure 2). 
Inconsistent cognitions were identified as simultaneous accessibility when they were 
expressed in close proximity to one another. 
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Figure 1: Forms of Ambivalence Hypothesised to be Reflected in Client Languagt: 
Ambivalence: 
Simultaneous accessibility 
of inconsistent attitudes 
towards target behaviour 
Figure 2: Forms of Cognitive Dissonance Hypothesised to be Reflected in Client Language 
Discrepancy between actual 
and ideal (Behaviour/current 
state of affairs and broader 
goals and values) 
/ 
~-----
\ 
Cognitive Dissonance: 
Simultaneous accessibility 
of inconsistent cognitions 
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To further the theory-led analysis of the data, the researcher used her knowledge of 
ambivalence and cognitive dissonance literatures to guide the identification of any additional 
themes occurring in the data set. The researcher's knowledge of the MISC 2.1 (Miller et al .. 2008), 
a coding framework which captures client language indicative of a movement towards and away 
from behaviour change, also informed the analysis due to its capability to identify many aspects of 
the ambivalence construct. 
The subjective nature of qualitative research methodologies such as thematic analysis 
means that many variables may threaten the quality of data collection, process of analysis and 
interpretation of results (Hayes, 1997). Variables such as the researcher's mood, style and sensory 
input impacts the ability to complete thematic analysis effectively. Individual cognitive style and 
technique, in addition to determination in gaining definitive conclusions influences the quality of 
themes developed and consistency in application. The researcher viewed their style as one 
consisting of a desire to complete the analysis effectively, within an ability to manage the ambiguity 
inherent in qualitative analysis. They ensured they were well rested and not pre-occupied with 
various concerns, in an attempt to minimize negative effects of mood and style on data analysis. 
During times of fatigue and frustration breaks from coding were taken. 
Procedure for Analysis 
The following six phases of analysis were completed. Movement occurred back and forth 
through these phases as required. These phases were guided by Braun and Clarke (2006) and 
Boyatzis (1998) on the completion of thematic analysis, particularly that which is theory-led: 
I. Development of theory driven themes 
The literatures on cognitive dissonance and ambivalence were initially used to identify 
themes expected to occur in the data. Cognitive dissonance themes include: inconsistent behaviour; 
inconsistent behaviour and affect; inconsistent behaviour and thoughts; and a discrepancy between 
the actual and ideal. Ambivalence themes include: cognitive-cognitive ambivalence; affective-
affective ambivalence; cognitive-affective ambivalence. 
2. Familiarisation with the data 
The ten sessions of video taped MET selected for analyses were transcribed. Two sessions 
were transcribed by the researcher to aide the familiarisation process. The remaining sessions were 
transcribed by an external transcriber. All transcripts were checked back against the original video 
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recordings for accuracy. All ten sessions were initially read through and an initial list of ideas 
recorded. The compatibility of themes to the raw information in the data set was verified. 
3. The generation of initial codes and themes 
Transcripts were indexed by allocating numbers to each line. Interesting features of the 
data were coded in a systematic fashion. Boyatis (1998) refer to a code as "the most basic segment 
or element of raw data or information that can be assessed in a meaningful way regarding the 
phenomenon" (pg 63). The identification of a priori developed themes was completed. A 
combination of theory-led and data-driven codes were also assigned to passages in the data. forming 
repeated patterns and themes within the data set. These additional codes and themes were either an 
expansion of the a priori developed themes or separate themes. Codes and themes were identified 
manually using coloured highlighters indicating patterns, they were then collated together and 
sorted into potential themes. The relationships between various themes were considered and 
primary and sub-themes identified 
4. Formation of main themes and sub themes 
A set of candidate themes (a priori and newly observed) were identified and underwent a 
process of refinement. Some were discarded whilst others were collapsed into each other. Others 
were broken down into separate themes. A candidate thematic map was developed and the validity 
of the initial themes checked within the entire data set. The data set was then reread to ascertain 
whether the candidate map accurately reflected the meanings evident and to code any themes 
missed in the initial analysis. A complete thematic map was then developed. 
5. Defining and naming themes 
Once a satisfactory thematic map was developed the themes were further refined and 
defined. The essence of each theme was identified and the aspect of data captured by each theme 
determined. The scope and content of each theme was described in a few sentences. The title of 
each theme was also refined to ensure a clear sense and understanding there significance. 
6: Producing the Report 
Once a set of fully worked out themes and the final thematic map were developed analyses 
were completed and the report written up. Vivid examples and extracts of each theme were 
provided to illustrate to the reader the essence of the point being demonstrated. The extracts were 
embedded within the analytic narrative, illustrating the story of the data, and an attempt was made 
to go beyond description to provide an argument relating to the research question. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
The aim of this chapter is to present the results of the Thematic Analysis. It will outline: a) 
the demographics of the participants included in the study; b) the characteristics of the MI treatment 
delivered; and c) how the results of the thematic analysis answer the three research questions. 
Participant Demographics 
The majority of participants in this study were male (911 0). Only one of the ten participants 
was female. Ages ranged from 26 to 61 years. The mean age was 39 years (SD=11.30). 5 
participants were employed; the remaining were unemployed (3) or unfit to work (2). 6 were 
married or co-habiting with partners; 2 were single and in a current relationship and 2 were single 
and not in a current relationship. 
Table 4: Participant Demographics 
Variable 
Age 
Mean (SD) 
Range 
Gender (N) 
Male 
Female 
Employment status (N) 
Employed 
Unemployed 
Unfit to work 
Participants (N=10) 
39.74(11.30) 
26.32-61.08 
9 
5 
3 
2 
Treatment Characteristics 
Out of the ten treatments 6 were delivered in Leeds, 3 in Birmingham. 1 in Wolverhampton. 
7 therapists were involved in the delivery. One therapist delivered three treatments and one 
delivered two. The length of MI session ranged from 31 to 70 minutes. The mean length was 55 A 
minutes (SD=10.79). The frequency and quality of treatment integrity was measured by a Process 
Rating Scale develop by the UKATT team (Middleton, Tober, Frier & Finnegan 2001), in which the 
extent and frequency which the therapists engaged in ten MI behaviours was measured, using a 
likert scale. The extent to which behaviours were carried out ranged from not at all (0) to 
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extensively (4). Quality of behaviours performed by the therapists ranged from not all \\'ell (0) to 
very well (4). In the current sample, the mean frequency was 2.98 (SD = 0.45), ranging from 2,33 
to 3.83. The mean quality was 1.68 (SD = 0.43), ranging from 0.73 to 2.18. 
Table 5: Treatment Characteristics 
Length of session 
Mean (SD) 
Range 
Variable 
Treatment site (N, %) 
Birmingham 
Wolverhampton 
Leeds 
Treatment integrity 
Frequency 
Mean (sd) 
Range 
Quality 
Mean (sd) 
Range 
Participants (N=10) 
55.40 (10.79) 
31-70 
3 
1 
6 
2.98 (0.45) 
2.33 - 3.83 
1.68 (0.43) 
0.78 - 2.18 
Research Questions 
This study examined client utterances during ten MI sessions using Thematic Analysis, in 
which utterances were coded using an a priori coding framework based on the literature on 
ambivalence and cognitive dissonance. The aim was to explore: 
a. The extent to which constructs related to ambivalence and cognitive dissonance were 
expressed by clients. 
b. Whether other expressions relevant to the process of change but not related to ambivalence 
and cognitive dissonance are also seen. 
c. Whether either ambivalence or cognitive dissonance more adequately captures the 
processes reflected in client language 
Finally, the intention was to use the thematic analysis to generate a map representing the 
clients' expressions of factors influencing their intention to change. 
How Were Constructs Related to Ambivalence and Cognitive Dissonance Expressed by 
Patients? 
The themes identified were associated with either the theoretical dimensions of 
ambivalence or cognitive dissonance. Themes were mutually inclusive, but not mutually exclusive. 
The a priori identified themes were evident in client language (see Figures 1 and 2). Support was 
provided for the existence of both inter and intra-component cognitive inconsistencies, and the 
simultaneous accessibility of such inconsistencies. Inconsistent thoughts, inconsistent thoughts and 
feelings and inconsistent feelings associated with an ambivalent experience were reflected in client 
language. Inconsistencies in behaviour, behaviour and affect, behaviour and cognitions and a 
discrepancy between a person's actual and ideal associated with cognitive dissonance were also 
evident. 
The theory-led analysis of the data also resulted in the identification of one additional 
theme associated with ambivalence, labelled magnified ambivalence. Five additional themes 
associated with cognitive dissonance were also evident in client language: importance of the self, 
belief disconfirmation, magnified cognitive dissonance, reducing cognitil'e dissonance towards 
change and reducing dissonance away from change. Complete candidate maps outlining the themes 
and sub-themes associated with ambivalence and cognitive dissonance are provided in Figures 3 
and 4 respectively. 
The following sections examine the expression of sub-themes relating to both theories in 
detail. The a priori identified themes are discussed first, followed by a discussion of the newly 
identified themes. Each is defined, and presented alongside example illustrative data from the 
analysis. The prevalence of ambivalence and cognitive dissonance and associated sub-themes are 
outlined in Table 6 and Table 7 respectively. 
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Figure 3: Complete Map Illustrating the A Priori and Newly Identified Ambivalence Themes 
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Table 6: Freguency of the E;mression of Ambivalence and its Sub-themes 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 MA Total Mean 
__ is.D) 
A Priori Identified 
Themes 
Cognitive-Cognitive 3 6 3 3 3 4 5 3 11 3 9 44 4.4 
Ambivalence (2.42) 
Affective-Affective 2 5 2 0 0 4 0 3 4 18 1.8 
Ambivalence (1.66) 
Cognitive-Affective 2 4 0 4 0 3 5 6 6 26 2.6 
Ambivalence (2.01) 
Co{?nitiol1 (-) 2 2 0 3 0 3 3 1 3 1 4 18 1.8 
Affect (+) (1.17) 
Cognition (+) 1 2 0 1 0 1 2 0 3 0 2 10 1.0 
Affect (-) (1.0)) 
Newll: Develol!ed 
Themes 
Magnified 4 0 0 5 4 3 0 19 1.9 
Ambivalence (MA) (1.83) 
Total 11 16 5 9 3 12 18 7 21 5 107 10.7 
(5.75) 
Mean (S.D) 2.75 4.0 1.25 2.25 0.75 3 4.5 1.75 5.25 1.25 26.5 
(0.83) (1.87) (1.09) (1.48) (1.30) (1.87) (0.5) (1.30) (3.77) (1.09) (10.62) 
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Table 7: Freguencl: of the E~ression of Cognitive Dissonance and its Sub-themes 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 MC Total Mean 
(S.D) 
A Priori Identified 
Themes 
Inconsistent Behaviour 0 1 0 0 1 2 2 0 1 3 8 0.8 
(0.75) 
Inconsistent Behaviour 0 4 2 0 3 4 3 2 19 1.9 
and Cognitions (l.45) 
Inconsistent Behaviour 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 6 0.6 
and Affect (0.66) 
Discrepancy Between 3 8 6 7 2 4 11 6 5 49 4.9 
the Actual and the Ideal (3.11) 
Newly DeveloQed 
Themes 
Importance of The Self 3 1 4 4 0 4 0 4 3 22 2.2 
(1.660 
Belief Disconfirmation 3 4 0 3 0 3 4 2 NIA 21 2.1 
(1.45) 
Reducing Cognitive 4 9 2 3 4 3 I I 2 NIA 40 4 
Dissonance in the (3.19) 
Direction Away From 
Change 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Me Total Mean 
(S.D) 
-
Reducing Cognitive 3 0 2 1 2 0 0 9 2 6 NIA 25 2.5 
Dissonance in the (2.77) 
Direction Towards 
Change 
Magnified Cognitive 3 3 0 4 0 0 3 NIA 15 1.5 
Dissonance (M C) (1.36) 
Total 19 32 12 24 15 11 25 19 32 16 205 205 
Mean (S.D) 2.11 3.56 1.33 2.61 1.67 1.22 2.78 2.11 3.56 1.78 22.78 20.5 
(1.37) (2.95) (1.83) (2.11) (1.41) (1.40) (3.12) (2.88) (3.06) (1.55) (13.2) (7.17) 
()() 
Ambivalence 
As hypothesised, client ambivalence towards a target behaviour and the prospect of 
changing it were expressed in the following ways: inconsistent cognitions, inconsistent affect. and 
inconsistent cognitions and affect. 
The researcher's familiarisation with the MISe 2.1 (Miller et al., 2008) was used to guide 
the identification of the three a priori identified forms of ambivalence: cognitive-cognitive 
ambivalence, cognitive-affective ambivalence, affective-affective ambivalence. The MISe 2.1 is a 
coding framework which captures language indicative of a movement towards change, termed 
"change talk" and language indicative of a movement away from change, termed "sustain talk". 
Information from the MISe 2.1 was utilised due to the proposal that the MISe 2.1 can be used in 
the identification of examples of ambivalence in client language (Amhrein et al .. 2003; Miller et al .. 
2008). Various categories, (reasons, desire, ability, need, commitment and other) supporting 
change and status quo were evident in client language observed in this study and utilised in the 
formation of the ambivalent sub-themes. An additional category of the MISe 2.1 labelled 'taking 
steps' was used to guide the identification of cognitive dissonance rather than ambivalence due to 
its focus on behaviour, a cognition encapsulated in dissonance theory. Contrary to the MISe 2.1. 
language indicative of cognition and affect associated with changing target behaviour are 
distinguished from one another. 
Cognitive-cognitive Ambivalence 
This is defined as expressions of inconsistent cognitions regarding changing a target 
behaviour, occurring in close proximity to one another. 
I: I'm in my own little world really. 
T: When you are drinking? 
I: Yes. It gives me a bit oftime to myself, 
T: Right. So you are in your own world. It's time for you. It's sort of time out is what it 
sounds like. 
I: Yes - time out - yes. 
T: So what's good is that you enter into your own little world for a while and you hav(' time to 
yourself. What else is good about it? 
I: I talk more, like with my partner. Everything comes out. I'm more truthful. 
T: So when you've been drinking YOlljind that you talk more, you open up more and you feel 
YOll are more truthful. What else is good about it? 
I: It makes me sleep. I don't know. 
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T: That might be it. So when we look at what's good, you like having a drink and !zm'ing time 
to yourself, you enjoy the taste, you find you are more talkative and you open up more with 
your partner and it also helps you sleep. 
Can I flip the coin over here - what's not so good - what's bad about your drinking? 
I: When I turn the wrong way. I get argumentative which I don't now but I did. 
T: So if you are drinking a lot you become argumentative and YOli become dolem? 
I: Yes. 
T: OK - Tell me a little bit about that, it seems to big feature. Is it with evel}'body or with just 
some people? 
I: With my partner. I did drink a lot in front ormy kids and I was always bad tempered. 
T: So it makes you bad tempered with your children. So there's thatfactor but there's also 
you become argumentative and violent towards your partner. 
I: I have done, yes. 
T: That must lead to an unpleasant sort of environment for a couple of days after the event. 
I: Yes because I used to black out and not remember. 
T: So you suffered black outs as well? 
I: I have blackouts and not remembered. 
T8: 50-79 
The participant discusses four positive consequences associated with carrying out their 
drinking behaviour: it helps them get into their own little world, enables them to have some 
time out, allows them to talk with their partner in a more truthful manner and improves their 
sleep. These cognitions support status quo. Inconsistent to this the negative impact drinking 
has had on their life are then discussed: they argued more, drank in front of their kids, were 
bad tempered and had blackouts. These cognitions support behaviour change. 
Cognitive-cognitive ambivalence was expressed on 44 occasions by the ten participants. A 
Mean of 4.4 (SD = 2.42) were expressed within each session of ML ranging from 3 - 9. The highest 
number were expressed by participant 9 (N= 11). Six participants expressed cognitive-cognitive 
ambivalence on three occasions. 
Affective-affecti\'(.' Ambivalence 
Defined as expressions of inconsistent affect regarding changing a target behaviour. 
occurring in close proximity to one another. 
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T: OK so basically it helps you black out in various ways. But you also described previollsly 
how it makes you feel and it depresses your mood. 
I: Yes it does. Yes. 
T: So. At the end of the day on the one hand it helps you blank things out. On the other hand 
it actually makes you feel worse. 
I: Yes. 
TI2: 394-398 
T: So we are looking at the psychiatric side of things, depression is something that you call to 
mind. That sounds as though you relate that in some way to your drinking, the depression? 
I: Yes I did. I drank a lot when I was depressed. 
T: So you became depressed and drank a lot. Did the drinking make you depressed? 
I: I can't remember. I think so. 
T8:444-·N9 
The above two passages illustrate clearly inconsistencies and affect experienced due to 
drinking alcohol. The participants reflect upon how drinking can negatively affect their 
mood, but also be used to help them feel better. 
T: If we start off with if you have any concerns about your drinking. Obviously you have and 
that's why you are here. What do you like about you drinking? 
e: Basically it gives me a feeling of. I don't know what the words are, security, I like it a lot. I 
feel better about myself. 
T: I ... 
e: I feel a bit more self-confidence. 
T: It instils more self-confidence in you. 
c: Yea, it seems to get me up as well. you know obviously. 
T: Okay, so it cheers you up as well. 
e: Yea. 
T: It cheers you up as H'ell, it puts you in a happier mood. 
e: Yea. 
T: Yea okay. Anything else you like about you drinking? 
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c: Umm, to a certain extent some of the socialising but I am not really a social drinker. But ij I 
do so and have a bad drink a good session I tend to do it on my OWIl in private -to a certain 
extent socialising. 
T: So it helps you socialise to a certain extent its part of your socialisation. 
C: It is part of it - there is no way of avoiding it, even with my hobbies and meetings I go to 
(inaudible) in public houses everyone drinks. 
T: So its part of your lifestyle really is what your saying. 
C: Its part of my lifestyle. 
T: Part of your lifestyle, okay. Well anything else you enjo)' about you drinking? 
C: That I enjoy like? 
T: That you like about your drinking. 
C: Can't think of anything else. 
T: Okay, so you can't think of anything else you enjoy about your drinking. Okay. Tell me 
some of the things you don't like about your drinking. What are the bad things about yo{(r 
drinking? 
C: The physical affects it is having on me. 
T: Okay you're very concerned about the physical effects. 
C: Very concerned. 
T: You're very concerned about the physical effects. What else? 
C: The binge drinking. 
T: Okay. 
C: That is once I've hit it, it's absolutely uncontrollable until I have made myseljreally, really 
ill. 
T: aka)'. 
C: And I don't stop until I am ill. 
T: Okay, so you're saying that's its an important part when you start binge drinking you feel 
you have less control and you only stop drinking when .. 
C: I'm ill. 
T: You are ill. Well, anything else you don't enjoy about your drinking? The not so nice things 
about )'our drinking. 
C: Losing my temper. 
T: So you are a bit stuck are you? You'd like to go further? 
C: Yes. I don't really enjo}' drinking at the end of the day. You know it's ... mv trouble is I 
need to be able to control it rather than it control me. Sociable drinking - I'd be alright if I 
could do that but I do get the craving every' day. 
TOA-80 
The participant begins by expressing the various ways alcohol positively impacts their 
feelings. It gives feelings of security, self confidence and happiness. This positive affect the~' 
associate with their drinking supports status quo. In contrast to this, the participant expresses 
concern on the negative impact alcohol is having on their physical health. They also express 
that they do not really enjoy drinking and recognise that drinking can result in them losing 
their temper. These negative feelings support behaviour change. Another example of how the 
affective content of clinician's language can influence the elicitation and reinforcement of 
feelings associated with a behaviour, is provided. 
In total, affective-affective ambivalence was expressed on 18 occasions. A Mean of 1.8 
(SD = 1.66) were expressed within each session of MI. The number of expressions ranged from O-
S. Affect was expressed in three different ways: as an expression of a feeling (positive or negative) 
towards a target behaviour; as a feeling associated with changing or not changing a target 
behaviour; and as a positive or negative consequence associated with carrying out or not carrying 
out a target behaviour. The clinician's language was also taken into consideration when 
distinguishing between a participant's affect and cognitions associated with their target behaviour. 
For example, a clinician may ask, "how do you feel about your drinkingT or "what do you think 
about your drinking?" It was at times difficult to distinguish between language illustrative of affect 
from that illustrative of cognitions. 
Cognitive-affective Ambivalence 
Defined as expressions of inconsistent cognitions and affect regarding changing target 
behaviour, occurring in close proximity to one another. 
T: That puts you in a very high category. This is based on information from a census 
returned. So the percentage of population of women who drink above your category is nil. 
So you are in the highest drinking category. How do you feel about that? 
I: Terrible. 
T: You don't feel so good about that. 
I: No 
T: Is that what you had imagined? 
I: I assumed it was quite a bit but it is because I drink on my own. I don't go out. I think 
that's why I drink so much. 
T: You drink at home do you? 
If IU'ere to ask YOli now Carol what you like about your drinking? What would that he? 
I: It makes me go to sleep. 
T: Helps you sleep. That's a problem otherwise? 
I: Terrible sleeper. 
T: When you've had a drink what affect does that have on your sleeping? 
I: Oh I go to sleep like that. 
T: So you can go to sleep immediately. 
I: Um 
T: And then what happens - are you able to stay asleep for the night? 
I: Yes mostly. 
T: It doesn 'f disturb your sleep pattern? 
I: No it's just that when I don't have a drink I can't sleep. 
T: So your body has got used to using the alcohol in that way. Is there anything else 
particularly that you like about your drinking? 
I: No. 
T: Nothing at all. 
I: No 
T: OK so if I were to ask you what you don't like about your drinking what might that be? 
I: Well it makes me depressed so I have another drink to help me. But sleeping is the worst. 
The participant expresses negative affect on hearing that compared to the general 
population's alcohol intake they appear in the highest category. They also state that alcohol 
negatively affects their mood. These feeling experienced by the participant support behaviour 
change. In contrast to this, the participant expresses two cognitions supporting status quo. A 
positive consequence of drinking is its ability to improve the participant's sleeping patterns. 
Another reason the participant believes they drink so much is because of their tendency to 
drink on their own. Also illustrated is how the cognitive/affective content of clinician 
language can influence the component of a participant attitude elicited. Following the 
prevision of test results the clinician asks "How do you/eel about that", eliciting an affecthe 
rather then cognitive response. 
Cognitive-affective ambivalence was expressed on 26 occasions within the entire data set. 
A Mean of ~.6 (SD = :2.01) was expressed within each session of MI. The number of expressions 
ranged from 0-6. A distinction was also made between positive affect associated with target 
behaviour occurring in close proximity to negative cognitions, or cognitions indicating a movement 
in the direction towards change (cognitions (-) affect (+)); and negative affect associated with their 
target behaviour occurring in close proximity to positive cognitions, or cognitions indicating a 
movement in the direction away from change (cognitions (+) affect (-». Two passages contained an 
example of both types of cognitive-affective ambivalence. Cognitive (-) affect (+) \vas expressed 
on 18 occasions. A Mean of 1.8 (SD = 1.17) expressions occurred per MI session. ranging from 0-
3. Cognitions (+) affect (-) was expressed on 10 occasions. A Mean of 1.0 (SD = 1.0) was 
expressed in each MI session, ranging from 0-3. The example provided above is illustrative of 
cognitions (+) affect (-). The example provided below is illustrative of cognitions (-) affect (+). 
T: What did you like about your drinking? It sounds like there's something there that you like 
about your drinking, that it's doing something for you and I'm just wondering what that is? 
I: I suppose it could be escapism but I'm not sure what I'm escaping from. lust ... juSf ... 
instead of drinking socially I just drink excessively after a little while. 
T: As you say it sounds like you have this period of starting but you are not really sure why 
you are starting. 
I: No just relaxation. 
T: So drinking is relaxing for you. So what else is it doing for you? Making YOllfeel better? 
Making you feel worse? Making you feel more - I don't know - that you can enjoy 
something that you are doing? 
I: It feels better at the time. 
T: Feels better at the time. In which way does it feel better? 
I: lust relaxed, less tense better I think. 
T: Sometimes alcohol is not doing too much to you, it's just making you more relaxed and less 
tense and once you start drinking you can't stop but then I'm just wondering }t'hat you don 'f 
like about your drinking? 
I: It interferes with everything else. like work or home life or studying or ... it just takes over. 
There's nothing else. I'm not doing anything else. My life was worse. My life was just a 
round of drinking. I'd get up and started drinking, carry on drinking and eventually fall 
asleep in bed or wherever and then get up and start all over again. 
6: 41-63 
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The participant discusses the various ways drinking alcohol positively enhances their 
psychological well-being. The positive affect associated with drinking supports status quo. 
Alcohol enables them to escape in a way that helps them relax, feel better and experience less 
tension. In contrast, cognitively they recognise drinking alcohol interferes with their home 
and work life experiences, having a negative impact. These cognitions support behaviour 
change. 
Cognitive Dissonance 
As hypothesised, cognitive dissonance associated with a target behaviour was 
expressed in the following ways: inconsistent behaviour; inconsistent behaviour and 
cognitions; inconsistent behaviour and affect; and as a discrepancy between the actual and 
ideal (see Figure 2). 
Inconsistent Behaviour 
Defined, as clear references to current or recent behaviour expressed in close proximity to 
another, clear expression of current or recent behaviour inconsistent to this. 
T: You know it's not doing you any good. You know that once you've had that initial sort of 
drink you feel confident then you are going to plummet and you are not going to feel so 
good once the affect has worn off· 
I: Like New Years Day we spent New Year with mv brother and they kept saying have a drink 
of Guinness but no I was fine and I didn't have a drink all day and I felt fine then. 
T: What happened for you to feel that you didn't want a drink that day? 
I: I think we was at his house and there were so many people. Like there's only me and 
Michelle where I am and when she goes to school I am on my own most of the day. At his 
there were so many people. They've got grandchildren and it's lovely and they said help 
yourselfifyou want a drink and she said there's sherry there, trY a sherry but I didn't just 
drink one glass of sherry, I drink it all. 
T: Are you saying you did drink, or you didn't want to? 
I: No I did. 
T: What happened then? 
I: I drank it all. 
T: The whole bottle. 
I: Yes. 
T7: 12{}-143 
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Evident in this passage is inconsistency in how the participant chose to beha,·e during ~ew 
Year's Day. When first offered a drink the participant declined, however when offered again 
later the participant not only tried a drink, but proceeded to drink a whole bottle. 
In total, inconsistent behaviour was expressed on 8 occasions. A mean of 0.8 (SO = 0.75) 
were expressed in each MI session, ranging from 0-2. Four participants did not express this theme. 
Inconsistent Behaviour and Cognitions 
Defined, as clear references to current or recent behaviour, expressed in close proximity to 
thoughts inconsistent with that behaviour. 
T: So. At the end of the day on the one hand it helps you blank things out. On the other hand 
it actually makes you feel worse. 
I: Yes. It's just punishment. It's like spending all your money to punish yourself. I don't get 
any goodness out orit. Ifpeople could go and have a bottle of wine with a meal and have a 
natter and a giggle and really enjoy themselves. I just walk into the place and drink a 
whole bottle and order the next one. You know. And the next one and the next one until I'm 
wobbling home. That's just outrageous. It's totally outrageous 
T12: 378-403 
In this passage the participant provides a description of a specific aspect of their drinking 
behaviour. When they walk into a restaurant, pub or bar they tend to continue drinking 
alcohol until they wobble home. The participant also express numerous negative cognitions 
associated with their drinking behaviour; they refer to it as "spending aU your money to 
punish yourself' recognising that no good comes from the behaviour. These cognitions 
contradict their actions. 
Inconsistent behaviour and cognitions was expressed on 19 occasions within the data set. A 
Mean of 1.9 (SO = 1.45) were expressed within each MI session, ranging from 0-4. 
Inconsistent Behm,jour and Affect 
Defined, as clear references to current or recent behaviour, expressed in close proximity to 
affect inconsistent with that behaviour. 
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T: What's good about your drinking? 
I: Well, at the moment it helps me to relax and I seem to be more in control over the last 
couple of months than I have been in quite a while. 
T: Right so what's in the drink that helps you relax? What else is good about it? 
I: I enjoy it. 
T: What do you enjoy about it? 
I: I don't know because I'm not really a social drinker. My girlfriend doesn't drink and just 
nowadays I've been setting it back to 6 O'clock at night. 
T: So you are introducing quite a lot of control. 
I: Yes I've had to do that for myself because I know how weak willed I am. 
The participant describes being more in control of the behaviour, making positive changes. In 
conflict to this they reflected upon the enjoyment attained when drinking. These positive 
feelings may negatively influence drinking behaviour. 
In total, inconsistent behaviour and affect were expressed on 6 occasions. A Mean of 0.6 
(SD = 0.66) were expressed within each MI session, ranging from 0-2. Five participants did not 
express this theme. Although participants' target behaviour is central to all aspects of an MI 
session, clear references by the participants to their target behaviour was rarely expressed in close 
proximity to clear expressions of recent and current behaviour inconsistent with it, or inconsistent 
affect or cognitions. 
Discrepancy Between the Actual and Ideal 
Defined as clear references to current or recent behaviour, or the present state of affairs 
associated with that behaviour, expressed in close proximity to inconsistent broader goals and 
values. 
I: Oh it has been an important part of my life. It used to be seven nights a week at one time hur now 
it is weekends, it is binging. When it was seven nights a week, I didn't need to drink that fast. 
Now I need to get the same level as what I got in a week. in ll1'O days. I'm going to hm'e to stop it. 
T: So, you're going to hm'c to stop. You feel that that's the bottom line. 
I: Yes nmt' my liver's bad as well as mv heart, I don't want to throw my life away. I ha\'cll't got 
a proper life really. The consultant is telling me if I don't stop drinking I'm going to die llll\'l\"{l\'. 
/{I can stop drinking she said I die ofsomething else in 30 rears time. 
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T: It sounds as if you are able to do something about your drinking; she thinks you ''Ve got someThing 
to look forward to. 
I: 
T: 
Yes I'll save up and have a good holiday. 
Your relationship with your partner as well. 
I: Yes and I've got a mortgage to pay. It looks better itI can do it. 
T1:623-636 
The participant describes the present state of affairs associated with their current 
drinking behaviour; they tended to drink the same amount in two days as they did in 
previous weeks. Subsequently, they describe their ideal situation; no longer wanting to 
waste their life due to drinking, endeavouring to save up to go on holiday wishing they 
are able to pay their mortgage. 
T: The biggest worry probably is the side to do with your children and with the facT that whaT 
you described is that you feel guilty. 
I: Definitely but their Mum doesn't understand. I've tried to explain to her that kids can be 
very therapeutic and they can be a great thing. They can give you strength when YOIl are in 
a scenario you've got to deal with and her stopping me from seeing my children is not 
helping my cause in the slightest. 
T: Right, so what you are saying is that one of the goals. One ofthe most important goals for 
you would be to get access to your children again. 
I: Definitely. 
T12:302-311 
The participant reflects upon their present state of affairs; he worries about his children and 
is currently being stopped from seeing them. His most important goal is to gain access to his 
children. 
Discrepancy between the actual and ideal was expressed on 49 occasions within the data 
set. A Mean of 4.9 (SD = 3.11) were expressed within each MI session. Participant 7 expressed the 
maximum number of this theme (N= 11). Participants 8 and 10 only expressed a discrepancy 
between their actual and ideal on 1 occasion. 
In addition to the a-priori coding frame based upon ambivalence and cognitive dissonance. 
allowance was given for the generation of new themes and sub-themes relating to one or both of 
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these theories. Several new themes and sub-themes were identified. Analysis led to more refined 
thematic maps for both constructs and incorporates the newly identified as well as the a priori 
themes, which are outlined in Figures 5 and 6. Appendix 6 and 7 provide an outline of candidate 
thematic maps developed in the early stages of analysis related to ambivalence and cognitiye 
dissonance respectively. A description of these themes is provided below, in addition to examples 
from transcripts illustrating them, An interpretative analysis is also provided. 
An additional theme associated with the construct of ambivalence was identified entitled: 
magnified ambivalence. During the analysis it was evident that participants expressed inconsistent 
cognitions in coinciding utterances. Direct acknowledgements of feeling ambivalent were also 
reflected in clients' language. The increased proximity of these utterances infers the simultaneous 
accessibility of cognitions would be greater, inducing a magnified state of inconsistent-related 
discomfort. 
Magnified Ambivalence 
Defined here as the acknowledgement of feeling, conflicted in cognitions or feelings 
towards target behaviour. The presence of inconsistent cognitions within coinciding utterances is 
also included as is a positive response to a double sided reflection made by the therapist. This also 
includes an inability to make a decision regarding changing or not changing the behaviour (either 
not able to make a decision or fluctuating in a decision regarding what they want to do). 
c: I've decided I don't want to drink at all but my body and my mind are telling me different 
things. I mean, em ... Last night, it's daft. It's a daft thing this situation. 
T2: 375 -376 
The participant expresses a conflict between their body, perhaps associated with the 
more affective aspects of their attitude, and their mind, perhaps more associated with 
the cognitive components of their attitudes. 
c: Somehow, ilyou could take the section olmy brain away which is saying, come on lad take 
a drink it will do you the world olgood, have a laugh. If you could just take that Ollt. Co: 
I'd just go out for say, Sunday lunch and a Saturday, Tuesday night. 
T2:390-392 
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The participant goes on to express the wish that the section of their brain supporting 
the continuation of their behaviour could be removed, indicating that this could 
strengthen their positive attitudes associated with behaviour change. 
T: That could be one option but it has got to be down to you really. It seems to be something 
you feel unsure about or unconfident about in terms of actually stopping. Another option is 
to come back and see how you've got on but you've got to be ready to make that choice. If 
you don'tfeel able to do that today then that'sfine, you can discuss it next time. 
I: Well I'll leave it for today. 
T: You're not ready to make a decision about it today. 
I: I'm going to think about today and how this session has gone and then I'll make a decision 
from there. Is that alright? 
T2:430-437 
The participant reports at the end of their session that they are not yet ready to make 
a decision regarding actions about their behaviour. They would like to reflect upon 
the session, making a decision at a later point. This reflects their ambivalent state 
towards changing target behaviour. 
Magnified ambivalence was expressed on 19 occasions in the entire data set. A Mean of 
1.9 (SD = 1.89) expressions occurred within each MI session. Magnified ambivalence was not 
expressed by three participants and only expressed once by three participants. Participant 6 
expressed the maximum number (N=5). Participants 1 and 7 both expressed magnified 
ambivalence on 4 occasions. The majority of expressions of magnified ambivalence occurred in the 
latter part of the MI session. It is noted, however, that few expressions of magnified ambivalence 
occurred within the data set. 
Five additional themes were identified associated with the experience of cognitive 
dissonance: importance of the self, belief disconfirmation, magnified cognitive dissonance, reducin!!, 
cognitive dissonance towards change and reducing cognitf\'e dissonance away from chan!!,e. The 
former three themes are hypothesised to result in an experience of inconsistent-related discomfort 
the latter two are associated with attempts to achieve cognitive consistency. These themcs were 
guided by research illustrating: the role the self plays in the dissonance process; the impact of the 
provision of new and conflicting information on the magnitude of dissonance; the relationship 
betwcen the simultaneous accessibility of inconsistent cognitions on the intensity of incon .... istcnt-
7.1, 
related discomfort; and the proposal that a motivational drive to achie\e cognitive consistency is 
experienced. 
Importance of the Self 
Defined as reflections on being happy or disappointed in oneself due to carryino out taroet 
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behaviour. Reflections on inconsistencies in the type of person one is whilst carrying out and not 
carrying out target behaviour, expressed in close proximity of one another. 
I: If I stick to my limit I just get tipsy and I don't get drunk. When I drink I turn into a prat 
like most people probably do. I get too aggressive sometimes. 
T: Right, so if you drink too much you act like a prato 
I: Yes, once I get past a certain point, there's not a lot that would stop me. 1 drink to oblivion 
once I'm past a certain point. 
T: You said a number of things there that you are not happy about. One is that YOU act like a 
prat - many people do. Not many people like to see a video ofthemsell'es when they've 
drunk a great deal. 1 think you are absolutely right there, it's very common but the point is 
that you are not very happy about you doing it. 
So you are not happy about that. You described becoming aggressive when you have over 
done it; if you go past a certain limit. 
I: Not every time. 1 'm a placid person bv nature and it brings me out of my shell. Sometimes 
I feel like it goes to the opposite. 
T: you don't like the things that you do. Is that right? 
I: No I don't. I am a completely different person. You see me now, straight, you know 1 am 
rational about things and you know I can hold a discussion and put a point of view across 
but as soon as the beer goes down the neck it's just a different person. It's completely alien 
to me. I just turn into a monster and I don't like that monster. 
T3: 217-222 
The participant discusses the inconsistencies between the person they are whilst 
drinking and not drinking. When sober they see themselves as placid, rational, 
capable of holding a discussion, and getting their point of view across. Whilst drinking 
they become a different person, being aggressive, which they describe as monstrous. 
On two occasions they expressed dissatisfaction towards the person they become whilst 
drinking. 
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In total, importance of the self occurred on 22 occasions. A mean of 1.1 (SD = 1.66) \\ere 
expressed within each session of MI, ranging from 0-4. Four participants expressed this theme on -+ 
occasions. Two participants did not express language relating to the importance of the self. 
Experience of Belief Disconfirmation 
Defined as a negative or surprised reaction to new information provided by the therapist 
regarding the consequences of carrying out a target behaviour on their lives. 
T: So that is a bit of range to inform you about the blood alcohol levels. If we look over here, 
we then find that in a typical week from your questionnaires, you H'ould have a reading of 
around about 600. 
I: Wow. 
T: You really do look shocked this time. 
I: Yes. 
T: On a heavier day of drinking it sounds as though your drinking was pretty much the same. 
So 600 is the sort of blood alcohol level we would expect to find within yourself when you 
were drinking heavily. 
I'd just like to ask you about your reaction to that first of all. First of all YOlt gasped as 
people do when they are surprised or shocked about things. What 'went through YOllr mind 
when you looked at that? 
I: It just seems, everything that is wrote down - it just seems a shock for me. I didn't think it 
was that bad. I honestly didn't think it was that bad at all. 
T: It sounds similar to before when you knew it was high but were surprised to find out just 
how high it is. 
What's going through your mind now - what are your feelings about it now? 
I: I'm disgusted with myself 
T: You're disgusted. Really. So you are really very unhappy to see these figures aren't you 
and you feel disgusted? 
sobs 
It's OK take your time. 
This has had quite an impact on you hasn't it? 
sobs 
Alright YOIi just take your time and recover a bit. 
Can I ask you nOH' what is it that is making you cry at the moment? What;s going through 
"our mind? 
I: It's thl! knowing. 
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T: Knowing that you were drinking at these levels. 
I: Yes 
T8: 336-305 
On hearing feedback from their test results the participant expresses shock and the 
therapist observed a distressing emotion. The participant states that they did not 
think it was that bad, strengthening the idea that they have been provided with new 
information conflicting their cognitions. The negative affect they experienced. 
combined with the statement "it's the knowing", further substantiates the belief 
disconfirmation hypothesis that the provision of new and conflicting information 
results in cognitive dissonance. They express disgust with themselves, further 
supporting the importance of the self in the dissonance experience. This passage 
suggests that when a person is provided with new and conflicting information, not onl~' 
do they experience an increased simulations awareness of their inconsistent cognitions, 
but also a threat to their integrity. 
T: Ifwe look at these anyway. Your GGT. The day you and it, this was looking at how much 
you were drinking then. The normal score is less than or including 50. Your score was 
1150. 
C: (SILENCE) 
T: Are you surprised by that? 
C: I'm absolutely shocked. I haven't had anything to drink in a fortnight. 
TO: 714-719 
The participant responds with silence to the provision of the results of a liver 
functioning test. Following prompting by the therapist the participant states their 
absolute shock. This provides further evidence supporting the hypothesis that the 
provision of new and conflicting information results in negative emotion. 
Belief disconfirmation was expressed on 21 occasions within the data set. A Mean of 2.1 
(SO = 1.45) were expressed within each MI session, ranging from 0--+. 
Similar to language illustrative of ambivalence, client language representative of the 
various forms of cognitive dissonance and the experience of inconsistent-related discomfort occur 
in such a way to indicate a magnified experience of psychological tension. Participants expressed 
language reflecting a direct acknowledgement of feeling conflicted in cognitions associated with a 
target behaviour. Inconsistent cognitions also occurred within coinciding utterances. 
Magnified Cognitive Dissonance 
Defined here as the acknowledgement of feeling conflicted in cognitions associated with a 
target behaviour. The presence of inconsistent cognitions within coinciding utterances is also 
included as is a positive response to a double sided reflection by the therapist. 
C: That's what I said. like Jekyll and Hyde. 
T: Yeah, so it's actually made you like Jekyll and Hyde, you have like two different 
personalities or which one is it going to be. 
T2: 325-328 
The participant directly acknowledges inconsistencies in their personalities when drinking 
and not drinking. This passage provides further support for the importance of the self in the 
process of MI and the dissonance experience. 
Magnified cognitive dissonance was expressed on 15 occasions within the entire data set. 
A mean of 1 .5 (SD= 1 .84) occurred within each session of MI, ranging from 0-4. A discrepancy 
between the actual and ideal was the theme expressed the most in this form, occurring on five 
occaSIOns. 
A further two themes were identified relating to cognitive dissonance theory. 
They represent the idea central to this theory that once inconsistent-related discomfort is 
aroused an inherent drive to reduce the psychological tension is experienced. The first 
theme, reducing cognitive dissonance towards change, represents an attempt made to 
reduce inconsistent-related discomfort in the direction towards change. The second theme, 
reducing cognitive dissonance away from change, represents an attempt to reduce 
inconsistent-related discomfort in the direction away from change. 
Reducing Cognitil'e Dissonance Towards Change 
Clear expressions of recent or in-session alteration in how one appraises a target behaviour, 
indicating a movement in the direction of change. Also includes language reflective of past 
77 
attempts to reduce cognitive dissonance in the direction away from change. indicative of an in-
session or recent reduction in the use of such techniques. 
T: Your memory is bad as well? 
I: Yes my memory is bad so I'd like to stop. 
T: You think this is all due to your drinking? 
I: Yes it is. Well I think together ... when I had my heart attack I died 3 times so it may ha\'e 
done some brain damage to be honest. You know how you forget things like that. I was 
thinking ,well, has the blood stopped in my brain long enough for me to be, you know, 
forgetting things, but it isn't it is beer. You try to put other excuses on to it alld it's beer. 
They call me "Buck" - my nickname - it's shortfor bucket. 
TI :88-95 
Following a discussion of the participant's problem with their memory, the participant 
initially responds positively to the therapist's question, "you think this is all due to your 
drinking". Subsequently, they appear to alter their cognitions, emphasising the extent to 
which their heart attack may have impacted their memory. This is indicative of an 
attempt to reduce dissonance in the direction away from change. They immediately 
recognise that their memory problems are due to drinking and acknowledge their 
attempts to add cognitions to their repertoire which support status quo. This represents 
a clear attempt by the participant to reduce their dissonance in the direction towards 
behaviour change. 
I: You see this is why I decided to quit because I was drinking because I was depressed. 
Basically there was two, there was the police station that sort ofputs the process in after a 
couple o/weeks. The main point came when I was (inaudible) in August. I'd taken me and 
the wife and grandkids to Blackpool. She was walking on the beach with her grandson alld 
it's that image that stopped me drinking. I suddenlv realised that if I wanted to enjoy that I 
would have to stop drinking. It's that more than anything which was the main moti\'atillg 
factor that next "ear when I take the kids out I'm going to be cold stone sober. More 
importantly, it struck me that my wife wasn't particularlv happ)' because I'd been drinking 
when I was with the kids. I didn't drink much but it was enough. I also kilO\\, that although 
the wife is very supportive she is also "eo' waD' when I am drinking which is 
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understandable especially if we 've got kids around. It was at that point / said no. /\'e flOW 
got my own (these were her children) but I've now got my own grandson. 
T13: 377-389 
In this example the participant explicitly describes a recent realisation that they had to 
quit drinking and their reasons. Their main motivating factor is to enjoy their life. 
particularly spending time with their grandchildren and their partner's grandchildren 
in sobriety. This represents a very clear attempt by the participant to reduce their 
dissonance in the direction of change, by adding cognitions to their repertoire which 
strongly support behaviour change. 
In total, reducing cognitive dissonance towards change was expressed on 25 occasions. A 
Mean of 2.5 (SD = 2.77) expressions occurred in each MI session. The maximum number of 
expressions was 9. Three participants did not express this theme. 
Reducing Cognitive Dissonance Away From Change 
Language reflecting the addition of new cognitions supporting a target behaviour or the 
minimisation or trivialisation of problems associated with carrying out the behaviour. Includes 
language indicative of low self-efficacy regarding changing the behaviour or an externalisation of 
the responsibility of the behaviour and changing that behaviour. 
T: If you turn to the next page this is how alcohol might affect other areas in your life. This is 
about problems that you have in different areas of your hfe that might be related to your 
drinking. The first one is physical health and you have a score of 4 which is an abm'e 
average level so alcohol would cause you an above average level of problems with your 
physical health. Does that fit with your experience? 
/: What, me being ill? 
T: Yes as a result of alcohol. 
I: Yes I've always been anaemic since an early age. I found out when / \Vas 20, we're all 
anaemic in the family. 
T7:238-2.+0 
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The therapist provides the participant with feedback regarding the impact of drinking 
on their physical health. The participant responds in a way which indicates they are 
distracting themselves from negative cognitions associated with their drinking 
behaviour, in an attempt to reduce dissonance in the direction away from change. 
Rather than reflecting with the therapist about the impact of their drinking on their 
physical health, they describe a general health problem they have had since their 
youth, not associated with drinking. 
T: So you've already started to think about what you are going to say to people when you 've stopped. 
I: Oh yes. 1/ it happens yes. But I don't understand hmt' you are going to make it work at all actually. 
T: So you are not convinced this will be helpful. 
I: I just don't know. You are only showing me facts what I know really. I knew all that before 
I came. 
TI :338-343 
This example is illustrative of an attempt by the participant to reduce their 
inconsistent-related discomfort in the direction away from change, through 
externalising the responsibility of behaviour change onto the therapist rather than 
themselves. They express their ambivalence regarding whether they will change their 
behaviour, and concerns that attending treatment will not be helpful. 
T: OK can I move on to this one as well because these are all related. What this one is 
showing is that the word we need here is none. It is saying what is the percentage of the 
population drinking above your category. Well there is none because you are in the very 
highest category in the UK. What do you think a/that? 
I: I know a/ew. It is not a category I want to be in at all but ... 
T: So you don't like being in that category. 
I: Definitely not. 
T: So definitely you don't like being in it. You sound quite emphatic about that, tilat this is flO 
good/or you. So you don't like this. In/act you said definitely don't like this. You said 
something before '" 
I: Yes I know those who drink a lot more than me There should be some, like. it should he 
like 2 to even 5 million or something. 
T3 : 2 J J -~ :! 2 
Following being informed that their drinking behaviour falls into the highest category 
in the UK, the participant expresses their desire not to be in that category. Howeyer. 
they go on to express knowledge of people who drink a lot more than themselves. This 
is indicative of an attempt to reduce their dissonance state in the direction away from 
change, through minimising the severity of their drinking behaviour. The 
interpretation of their next utterance is somewhat challenging. It appears to infer the 
participant believes categories used to define how one's drinking behaviour compares 
to the general population may be inaccurate and should be altered. 
Reducing cognitive dissonance in the direction away from change was expressed on .+0 
occasions within the data set. A Mean of 4 (SD= 3.19) expressions occurred within each MI 
session. Participant 9 expressed the maximum number of this theme (N= 11). The minimum 
number occurring was 1, expressed by participant 6 and 8. Participant 9 also expressed the 
maximum number of cognitive-cognitive ambivalence (N= 11) in addition to the maximum number 
total expressions of ambivalence (N=27). 
The maximum number of expressions of inconsistent-related discomfort was also recorded 
by this participant (N=36). The participant who expressed the second highest number of reducing 
cognitive dissonance in the direction away from change (N=9) also expressed a high number of 
expressions of inconsistent-related discomfort (N=36). A more detailed analysis of participant 9's 
transcript of MI revealed that the high number of expressions of reducing cognitive dissonance 
away from change and of cognitive-cognitive ambivalence may be due to the overlapping nature of 
these themes. Included in language representing the reduction of cognitive dissonance in the 
direction away from change is that indicative of low self-efficacy when considering changing target 
behaviour. Language representing low self-efficacy could also be included in the theme of 
cognitive-cognitive ambivalence, in that cognitions supporting change expressed in close proximity 
to such language is captured in this theme. Reducing cognitive dissonance away from change and 
cognitive-cognitive ambivalence overlapped on five occasions in participant 9's transcript. 
Reducing cognitive dissonance in the direction away from change frequently occurred 
following the provision of feedback by the therapist. 11 (36.40/0) out of the 40 expressions of 
reducing cognitive dissonance in the direction away from change were prefaced by feedback. Two 
of these examples also included the expression of belief disconfirmation by the participant. An 
example is provided below: 
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T: Slightly higher. That's the right amountfor a woman infact. 21 isfor a man. So we are 
talking about over seven days, three units a day. Which is, if you had every day drinking 
one and a half pints a day. OK? 118 is obviously a lot more than 21 and as it says If you 
look at males your drinking rate is as high as you get. Over here we've got a number of 
units per week and the percentage of people who drink above that. You can see people who 
drink moderately 11 to 21 so that's just to the limit ... we are talking about a quarter of 
people drink more than the recommended limit. 12 percent of people drinkfairl), high. 5 
percent drink what is rated as 5 so that's up to 50 units per week which real(-\' puts them 
within the risk category so about 5% or a twentieth and then 51 plus YOll are talking about 
1% so you are in the top. 
1: General population. 
T: That's out of the general population. 
1: So that's not bad really It's not as bad as it could be. There could be a hell ora lot more 
people drinking a hell ora lot worse. 
T12:130-1..J.3 
The participant is informed that they drink more alcohol than 99% of the general 
population. Rather than reflect upon this information with the therapist, the participant 
appears to distract themselves from this new cognition in an attempt to reduce their 
dissonance state in the direction away from change. The participant focuses upon the 
amount the general population are drinking, stating "it is not as bad as it could be" and 
"there could be a hell of a lot more people drinking a hell of a lot worse". They ignore 
the importance of the information provided and the impact it may have. 
Summary 
In totaL ambivalence was expressed on 107 occasions. Four themes were identified, 3 a 
priori and 1 newly identified. A Mean of 10.7 (SD=5.75) expressions occurred within each MI 
session. The maximum number was expressed by Participant 9 (N=21). Participant 5 expressed the 
lowest number (N=3). Cognitive-cognitive ambivalence was expressed more than any other theme 
within this construct (N=44). Affective-affective ambivalence was expressed on 18 occasions and 
cognitive-affective on 26 occasions. A magnified ambivalent experience was hypothesized to occur 
on 19 occasions. The form of ambivalence expressed most in this form was cognitive-cognitivc 
ambivalence occurring on 9 occasions. 
In totaL cognitive dissonance was expressed on 205 occasions. OveralL nine themes wcre 
identified, four a priori and five newly identified. A Mean of 20.5 (SD=7.17) were expressed 
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within each session, ranging from 11-32. Participants 2 and 9 both expressed cognitive dissonance 
32 times. The minimum number of expressions was 11 expressed by participant 6. The theme 
expressed the most was discrepancy between the actual and the ideal (N=49). Reducing cognitive 
dissonance in the direction away from change was also one of the highest themes expressed ~:"\=-+O). 
The theme expressed the least was inconsistent behaviour and affect occurring on 6 occasions. A 
magnified cognitive dissonance experience was hypothesised to occur on 15 occasions. The form 
of cognitive dissonance expressed most in this form was a discrepancy between the actual and the 
ideal occurring on 5 occasions. 
Eleven of the thirteen ambivalence and cognitive dissonance themes identified represent 
language indicative of an experience of inconsistent-related discomfort (see Table 8). In total they 
were expressed on 241 occasions. A Mean of24.1 (SD=11.0) occurred within each MI session. 
Participant 7 expressed the highest number (N=40) and participant 5 expressed the lowest (N= 12). 
Two themes were identified illustrative of an attempt to reduce the experience of inconsistent-
related discomfort, indicative of a movement towards and away from change. The former were 
expressed on 25 occasions and the latter on 40 occasions (see Table 9). 
Overall thirteen themes, 7 a priori and 6 newly identified, representing the expression of 
ambi valence and cognitive dissonance were identified, 312 expressions occurred. A mean of 31 .2 
(SD=6.46) were expressed within each MI session. The theme expressed the most was a 
discrepancy between the actual and the ideal (N=47) and the theme expressed the least was 
inconsistent behaviour and affect (N=6). 
Were Other Observations Relevant to the Process of Change but not Directly Related to 
Ambivalence and Cognitive Dissonance also Evident? 
An additional theme not associated with the construct of ambivalence and cognitive 
dissonance was observed within the data set. 
Inaccessibility of cognitions associated with carrying out target behaviour 
Language expressing an acknowledgement or a reflection of not knowing the reasons for 
carrying out their target behaviour, or an inability to answer questions regarding this. 
T: What are the reasons why you do go back to it? 
I: I don't know. 
T2: 418--+19 
The participant clearly states no knowledge of why they return to drinking follo\\ing a 
period of abstinence. This indicates that such cognitions are inaccessible at this time. 
c: This time I'm finding it really, really difficult, and I don't know why. I mean normally 
Alison, its been really bad and I'd say to her that's it and I'll stay dO' and then something, I 
don't know why. Something will pop up and its not problems, I'\'e got no problems. 
TO: 408-410 
It is expressed here by the participant the difficulties experienced whilst attempting to sustain 
improvements in their drinking behaviour. They are unaware of where these difficulties lay . , 
feeling they have no problems. 
This theme was expressed on 5 occasions within the dataset. A mean of 0.5 (SD = 0.87) 
were expressed within each MI session, ranging from 0-1. The expression of inaccessibility of 
cognitions associated with carrying out target behaviour tended not to be followed by an attempt by 
the clinician to bring to mind such cognitions. 
A general observation of the data set can also be made. In addition to expressing 
inconsistent cognitions in close proximity, participants expressed inconsistent cognitions spread 
throughout the data set. It appeared that overall language reflecting reasons they should not carry 
out the target behaviour occurred more often than the reasons to continue. Cognitions supporting 
status quo tended to be expressed at the beginning of each MI session. This appeared to be 
influenced by the extent to which the clinician elicited such language by asking participants 
questions such as, "what is good about your drinking?" or "what do you enjoy about your 
drinking?" The MI sessions began by the clinician asking these questions, or by providing feedback 
of test results. When the latter occurred it was followed by the elicitation of cognitions supporting 
status quo. Once participants' cognitions regarding why they carry out their behaviour were 
elicited, clinicians elicited cognitions associated with negative aspects of their target behaviour. As 
treatment progressed, clinicians increasingly elicited language indicative of a movement towards 
rather than away from change. This may be expected given the focus of MI to first elicit then 
resolve ambivalence. Clinicians appeared to move towards resolving participants' ambivalence in 
the direction towards change. The first MI session was included in this analysis, due to its focu\ on 
eliciting ambivalence and beginning the process of resolving ambivalence. It is possible that some 
clinicians began the latter process in the direction of change, before fully eliciting and magnifying 
the ambivalent experience. 
Does Ambivalence or Cognitive Dissonance More Adequately Capture the Processes 
Reflected in Client Language? 
Client language representing an experience of cognitive dissonance was expressed on more 
occasions than that illustrative of an experience of ambivalence. 205 and 107 expressions occurred 
respectively. Nine cognitive dissonance themes were identified in comparison to four ambivalence 
themes. The theme expressed the most was a discrepancy between the actual and the ideal captured 
under the construct of cognitive dissonance. 
As detailed in this study's literature review, the concept of cognitive dissonance is a broad 
theory encapsulating a wide range of inconsistent cognitions. It encapsulates not only the broader 
cognitions related to target behaviour and the inconsistencies between them but also the inconsistent 
attitudes (thoughts and feelings), which are more specifically held towards changing that behaviour. 
captured by the concept of ambivalence. Therefore, the four themes and 107 expressions of 
ambivalence which occurred can also be considered as cognitive dissonance, resulting in a total of 
312 expressions and thirteen themes. It could be concluded that cognitive dissonance theory more 
adequately captures the processes reflected in client language than the theory of ambivalence. 
The construct of ambivalence is, however, used to describe the primary process in MI. the 
aim being to elicit and resolve this experience. The concept of ambivalence may more adequately 
capture this specific process reflected in client language, given the cognitive components it 
encompasses and focus towards a specific attitude object. 
Table 8: Freguenn of the EXQressions of Inconsistent Related Discomfort 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total Mean 
(S.D) 
Ambivalence 
A Priori Identified Themes 
Cognitive-Cognitive 3 6 3 3 3 4 5 3 11 3 44 4.4 
Ambivalence (2.42) 
Affecti ve-Affecti ve 2 5 1 2 0 0 4 0 3 18 1.8 
Ambivalence (1.66) 
Cognitive-Affective 2 4 0 4 0 3 5 6 26 2.6 
Ambivalence (2.01 ) 
Cognition (-) 2 2 0 3 0 3 3 1 3 I 18 1.8 
Affect (+) (1.17) 
COf!,nition (+) Affect I 2 0 1 0 1 2 0 3 0 10 1.0 
(-) (1.0)) 
Newly DeveloQed Themes 
Magnified Ambivalence 4 0 0 5 4 3 0 19 1.9 
(1.83) 
Cognitive Dissonance 
A Priori Identified Themes 
Inconsistent Behaviour 0 0 0 2 2 0 8 0.8 
(0.75) 
Inconsistent Behaviour and 0 4 2 0 3 4 3 19 1.9 
Cognitions ( 1.45) 
Inconsistent Behaviour and 2 0 0 0 0 0 6 0.6 
Affect (0.66 ) 
Discrepancy Between the 3 8 6 7 2 4 II 6 49 4.9 
Actual and the Ideal (3.11) 
Newly DeveloQed Themes 
Importance of The Self 3 4 4 0 4 0 4 22 2.2 
(1.66) 
xc) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total Mean 
(S.D) 
Belief Disconfirmation 3 4 0 3 1 0 3 4 2 21 2.1 
(1.45) 
Magnified Cognitive 3 3 0 4 1 0 0 3 15 1.5 
Dissonance (1.36) 
Total 21 36 13 25 11 22 39 16 37 12 232 232 
Mean (S.D) 2.1 3.6 1.3 2.5 1.1 2.2 3.9 1.6 3.7 1.2 23.2 23.2 
(1.3) (2.5) (1.79) (2.11) (1.37) (1.77) (2.84) (1.62) (3.07) (0.75) (13.05) (13.05) 
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Table 9: Freguenq: of the Ex~ressions of Attem~ts to Reduce Inconsistent Related Discomfort 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total Mean 
(S.D) 
Reducing Cognitive 4 9 2 3 4 3 1 1 2 40 4 
Dissonance in the (3.19) 
Direction A way From 
Change 
Reducing Cognitive 3 0 2 2 0 0 9 2 6 25 2.5 
Dissonance in the (2.77) 
Direction Towards Change 
Total 7 9 4 4 6 1 3 10 13 8 65 65 
Mean (S.D) 3.5 4.5 2.0 2.0 3.0 0.5 1.5 5.0 6.5 4.0 32.5 6.5 
(0.5) (4.5) (0.0) (1.0) (1.0) (0.5) (1.5) (4.0) (4.5) (2.0) (7.5) (3.44) 
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION 
The purpose of this chapter is to: a) summarise the findings of this study within the 
context of the MI and social psychology literature; b) outline its strengths and limitations: c) 
discuss the clinical implications of the findings; and d) outline areas for future research. 
Context of Study 
This study is a secondary analysis of data from a multi-centre trial evaluating th~ 
outcome of MI in the treatment of alcohol problems (UKATT, 2005). Two discrepancy-related 
theories have been proposed to be important in the treatment process of MI: ambivalence and 
cognitive dissonance. The elicitation and resolution of a person's ambivalence towards 
changing their target behaviour is hypothesised to have a central role in Mrs effectiveness. 
Cognitive dissonance was previously emphasised as a key active ingredient in Mrs 
motivational processes in the original account. More recently cognitive dissonance has been 
dismissed, replaced with the idea of developing a discrepancy between a person's actual and 
ideal. Research has not, however, examined the relative potential role of these processes as 
mechanisms of change within MI. The aim of this study is to investigate how ambivalence and 
its associated constructs are expressed in sessions of MI in the treatment of alcohol problems. 
Discussion of Research Questions Within the Context of the MI and Social Psychology 
Literature 
How are Ambivalence and Cognitive Dissonance Expressed in MI? 
Application of the MI motivational process model discussed in Chapter 2 of this study 
to transcripts of MI sessions enabled the identification of variations in the expressions of 
cognitive dissonance and ambivalence in client language. The occurrence of language 
indicative of the three discrepancy-related theories proposed to be important in MI's change 
process: ambivalence, cognitive dissonance and a discrepancy between the actual and ideal were 
found (Miller, 1982 c.f. Mint Bulletin 2008; Miller 1983; Miller & Rollnick, 2002). 
Ambivalence research concludes that the ambivalent experience can be induced when a 
person holds conflicting attitudes, consisting of inconsistencies either within or between its 
various components (Connor & Sparks, 2002; Connor & Armitage, in press). Analysis of client 
language revealed the occurrence of intra-component ambivalence and inter-component 
ambivalence. Intra-component ambivalence was illustrated through the expression of 
inconsistent thoughts and inconsistent feelings. Inter-component ambi valence was illustrated 
through the expression of inconsistent thoughts and feelings. The form of ambivalence 
expressed the most was cognitive-cognitive ambivalence, occurring nearly twice as often as 
cogni tive-affecti ve and affecti ve-affecti ve ambi valence. Cogniti ve-cogniti ve ambi valence was 
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also expressed on more occasions than all but one of the other ambivalence and cognitive 
themes identified. Such findings suggest clinicians tend to elicit a person's thoughts associated 
with a target behaviour, more so than their feelings. This may be expected. given different 
components of attitudes are not explicitly distinguished from one another in ~u and the 
importance of eliciting inconsistencies in-between and within the different components of 
attitudes are not overtly emphasised (Miller & Rollnick, 2002). 
Client language illustrative of an experience of cognitive-affective ambivalence evoked 
particular interest. Research indicates that when cognitive-affective ambivalence is 
experienced, affect tends to override thoughts in determining overall attitudes and behaviour. 
particularly when affect is positive (Lavine et al., 1998). Language reflecting a positive feeling 
associated with a target behaviour together with a negative cognition occurred nearly twice as 
often as language consisting of a negative feeling associated with a target behaviour and a 
positive cognition. It is expected that participant's positive feelings associated \vith a target 
behaviour, within the context of their cognitive-ambivalent experience, influences their overall 
attitudes to support the status quo, reducing the possibility of behaviour change. These findings 
strengthen recommendations that researchers and clinicians identify cognitive-affective 
ambivalence, and assess the influence of cognitive and affective components of attitudes on 
commitment language and behavioural outcome (Leffingwell et a/., 2006). 
The three inter-component cognitive inconsistencies (inconsistent behaviour and 
cognitions, inconsistent behaviour and affect and a discrepancy between the actual and the 
ideal) originally associated with the theory of cognitive dissonance and the processes of MI 
(Miller, 1982; Mint Bulletin, 2008), were reflected in client language. Participants expressed a 
discrepancy between their actual and ideal more than any other type of cognitive inconsistency. 
and indeed any other theme encapsulated under cognitive dissonance and ambivalence theory. 
The growing emphasis on the importance of eliciting a person's discrepancy between their 
present state of affairs and broader goals and values as an active ingredient in Mrs motivational 
processes (Miller & Rollnick 2002) is substantiated. Miller and Rollnick's move to dismiss the 
importance of the role of cognitive dissonance in MI, proposing that it is merely a person's 
discrepancy between their actual and ideal that is important is questionable. however. The 
occurrence of participant language describing present state of affairs in close proximity to 
inconsistent broader goals and values, infers cognitions may be simultaneously accessible to the 
client. Findings from the cognitive dissonance literature (Newby-Clark et al.. 2(02), illustrating 
that the simultaneous accessibility of inconsistent cognitions increases the probability that 
inconsistent-related discomfort will be induced. suggests individuals attending MI experience 
not only a discrepancy between their actual and ideal, but cognitive dissonance associated with 
such discrepancies. 
In the original description of MI (Miller. 1982 c.f. Mint Bulletin. 2(08) it was proposed 
that developing a discrepancy between a person's behaviour and other cognitions \\as central to 
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MI's effectiveness. Given that target behaviour is central to therapist and client dialogue. it 
could be argued that any client language consisting of cognitions supporting beha\'iour chang~ 
are indicative of an experience of inconsistent-related discomfort within the client, Social 
psychology research (Newby-Clark et al., 2(02) suggests a method to reduce cognitive 
dissonance is to distract oneself from one or both conflicting cognitions. It is possible that 
clients expressing cognitions inconsistent to their behaviour were distracting themselves from 
specific details of that behaviour. Inconsistent cognitions may not be simultaneously accessible 
and a dissonant state not aroused. Language reflecting thoughts and feelings associated with a 
target behaviour were only coded as cognitive dissonance when they occurred in close 
proximity to language detailing specific aspects of behaviour. This may explain the limited 
number of times that inconsistent behaviour and affect and inconsistent behaviour and thoughts 
were expressed. This may not be a true reflection of the extent to which these latter forms of 
cognitive dissonance are experienced in sessions of MI and may require a different approach to 
the investigation. According to dissonance theory, inconsistencies also exist within behaviours 
(Festinger, 1957). A person may choose to act a certain way on one occasion and within a short 
period of time choose to act in a way which is inconsistent with previous behaviour. Language 
representing the simultaneous awareness of inconsistent behaviour occurred on very few 
occaSIOns. 
As cognitive dissonance theory underwent revision and development, researchers 
became more aware of the importance the self plays in the dissonance experience (Cooper. 
2007). Three self-related theories were developed: self-affirmation, self-consistency and new 
look theory. These share the notion that when a person develops a discrepancy between their 
behaviour and their view of themsel ves as moral and integral, or their sel f standards, 
inconsistent-related discomfort is induced. Self-discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1987), a concept 
closely related to cognitive dissonance, proposes a person can hold inconsistent cognitions 
towards oneself inducing variations of negative affect. 
This study supports the occurrence of such self-related discrepancies, illustrating how 
their awareness can be demonstrated through language. Participants did not directly refer to. or 
acknowledge threats to their self integrity, however they described feeling disgusted, 
disappointed or unhappy with themselves. They also described the person they are \vhen 
carrying out their behaviour, in close proximity to descriptions of their personality when not 
carrying out their target behaviour. Inconsistencies often existed between these two personality 
states. On occasion, participants directly acknowledged a distinct discrepancy in their 
personality state, dependent on their behaviour, one participant referring to themselves as Jekyll 
and Hyde. These patterns in client language further strengthen the hypothesis in Chapter 2. that 
in addition to eliciting ambivalence and a discrepancy between the actual and ideal. the 
availability and awareness of threats to self integrity and self-discrepancies should be increa'led. 
Although it did not occur in this study, the importance of the self could also be integrated into 
91 
conversations regarding a person's discrepancies between their present state of affairs and 
broader goals and values. Explicit discussions surrounding how the importance of the self 
influences discrepancies between a person's actual and ideal could improve YlI's processes and 
effectiveness. MI and self-discrepancy literatures both utilise the term, "discrepancy between 
the actual and ideal". Higgins, (1987) outlines three self-discrepancy states. one of which can 
be described as a discrepancy between who a person is and who they would like to be. referred 
to as their actual and ideal. MI uses similar language to describe a discrepancy between a 
person's state of affairs and their broader goals and values. The striking similarity in the 
language used across MI and self-discrepancy theory emphasises the importance the self plays 
in aiding the development of a person's discrepancy between their current situation and broader 
goals. 
A close look at the language participants expressed following the provision of feedback 
by the therapist supports findings under the belief disconfirmation paradigm (Festinger et al .. 
1956) in the cognitive dissonance literature. This paradigm indicates that when new and 
conflicting cognitions are made available. inconsistent-related discomfort is induced. Clients 
frequently expressed shock and surprise in response to feedback of test results. They also 
reflected on negative feelings associated with hearing such information. The belief 
disconfirmation paradigm indicates that when such language is expressed after feedback 
psychological tension or discomfort is induced. Patterns in client language suggest cognitive 
dissonance theory can be utilised to understand the motivational processes occurring in 
variations of MI treatment, such as those incorporating feedback. 
Support is also provided for the argument in the cognitive dissonance literature that 
inconsistent-related discomfort is followed by an inherent motivational drive to achieve 
cognitive consistency (Elliott & Devine, 1994). Miller's (1982) original proposition that clients 
attending MI use methods such as denial and low self-efficacy to reduce dissonance in the 
direction away from change is also substantiated. Evidence is provided confirming the proposal 
in Chapter 2 that Miller and Rollnick (2002) rejected the role of cognitive dissonance in MI too 
soon. In particular, the evidence provided contradicts Miller and Rollnick's rationale for 
dismissing cognitive dissonance; to avoid the motivational drive to achieve cognitive 
consistency central to dissonance theory. 
Methods identified to reduce inconsistent-related discomfort in the cognitive dissonance 
literature such as distraction, trivialisation and low self-efficacy (Harmon-Mill & Jones. 1999). 
are present in client language in the current study. On occasion, client's expressed language 
was representative of an attempt to minimise or distract oneself from the problem or an inability 
to change their behaviour, indicative of a movement in the direction away from change. It wa, 
also possible to code language indicative of a movement towards behaviour change. This 
consisted of either a clear acknowledgement of an alteration in how one appraise" behaviour. 
reflectin~ an awareness of reducing dissonance away from change. or language indiL'ati ng a 
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recent or in-session reduction in the use of techniques such as distraction. The fact that attempt-; 
to ameliorate inconsistent-related discomfort in the direction away from change were identified 
nearly twice as often as attempts to reduce discomfort in the direction towards change. "ugge"h 
participants' were overall moving towards a position of consistency, through changing 
cognitions rather than behaviour. 
An attempt to reduce dissonance was only coded when a very clear example of 
language illustrative of a movement towards or away from change was evident. Festinger"s 
(1957) reduction of dissonance formula proposes that consistency can be achieved by increasing 
the number of consonant cognitions and decreasing their discrepancy. This infers that language 
representing a movement towards or away from change, termed "change talk" and "sustain 
talk," in the MISC 2.1 (Miller et ai., 2008) could be classified as language indicative of attempts 
to achieve consistency. The importance or strength of cognitions associated with the target 
behaviour, also coded in the MISC 2.1, could be categorised as attempts to reduce dissonance. 
Perhaps the two sub-categories of the MISC 2.1 most evident for coding attempts to achieve 
consistency are Ability and Taking Steps. A person's level of self-efficacy regarding their 
ability to change their behaviour has been recognised for its influence on dissonance reduction 
(Condiotte & Lichtenstein, 1981). Taking Steps includes language illustrative of specific 
aspects within client's behaviour representing a movement either towards or away from change. 
Such language could be interpreted as attempts by participants to achieve consistency through 
changing their behaviour to support status quo or change. 
The current study also found evidence supporting the argument that the greater the 
magnitude of dissonance, the greater the motivational drive to reduce discomfort (Festinger. 
1957). This further substantiates the occurrence of dissonance reduction in MI. particularly in 
the direction away from change. The two participants who expressed language reflecting an 
attempt to reduce dissonance away from change most frequently, also expressed language 
indicative of an experience of inconsistent-related discomfort on many occasions. The arousal 
of a motivational drive to achieve consistency within clients attending MI. predominantly in the 
direction away from change, is further substantiated as is the proposal in the belief 
disconfirmation paradigm that when new and conflicting information is added to a person'" 
repertoire, a drive is experienced to reduce the discomfort this causes. Provision of new and 
conflicting information by the clinician is frequently followed by language representing an 
attempt to reduce dissonance in the direction away from change. 
On occasion, inconsistent cognitions were expressed in coinciding utterances. The 
simultaneous accessibility of inconsistent cognitions and evaluations are measured by assc"sing 
the length of time it takes a person to respond to unipolar evaluation questionnaires (Ba""ili. 
1996). The simultaneous accessibility of inconsistent evaluations is associated with highcr 
potential ambivalence (Bassili. 1998) and has been found to moderate the relationship betwcen 
potential and felt ambivalence (Newby-Clark et al., 2(Xr~). The simultaneous acce"sihility of 
inconsistent cognitions is therefore expected to increase the closer the proximity of cognition:-. 
When inconsistent cognitions are expressed in coinciding utterances participants magnitude of 
inconsistent-related discomfort increased. 
Expressions by participants of a direct acknowledgement of feeling conflicted, 
strengthens the conclusion that individuals attending MI experience ambivalence and counitive 
eo 
dissonance. Inconsistent cognitions occurring in close proximity to one another are similar to 
measures of potential ambivalence (Kaplan, 1972) and measures of simultaneous accessibility 
(Bassili, 1996), in that conclusions that inconsistent-related discomfort is experienced are only 
hypothesised, as grounded in relevant theory. Similar to measures of felt ambivalence (Priester 
& Petty, 1996), direct acknowledgements of feeling conflicted clearly indicate that participants 
intuitively recognise a cognitive dissonance or ambivalence state within themselves. 
As MI sessions progressed the proximity of inconsistent cognitions associated with a 
target behaviour tended to increase in proximity to one another. Direct acknowledgements of 
feeling conflicted also occurred in the latter half of the MI sessions. This suggests that these 
experiences are magnified as the first session of MI progresses, providing further support to the 
hypothesis that MI elicits ambivalence and cognitive dissonance. 
Ambivalence and cognitive dissonance theories from social psychology have much to 
offer researchers and clinicians developing and delivering MI. The breadth and depth of these 
theories, their conclusions and research methodologies, have the potential to expand current 
understanding of the motivational processes occurring within MI, and ultimately improving its 
effecti veness. 
Are There Other Processes Reflected in Client Language not Associated with ambivalence or 
Cognitive Dissonance? 
As the researcher analysed client language, other patterns not associated with 
ambivalence or cognitive dissonance were evident. In general, it appeared that clinicians 
specifically elicited clients' cognitions associated with status quo at the beginning of each 
session, asking questions such as, "what do you like about your drinking?" They quickly 
moved on to focusing upon eliciting cognitions associated with behaviour change, asking 
questions such as "what do you dislike about your drinking?" It could be argued this is an 
expected pattern, given MI's focus on resolving ambivalence in a way which results in 
commitment language and, ultimately, behaviour change. It is possible clinicians tended to 
move towards eliciting change and commitment language, without fully magnifying the 
ambivalent experience. It was also evident on several occasions that participants expressed 
being unaware of their reasons for carrying out their behaviour. Clinicians do not appear to 
focus their attempts upon increasing client's awareness and accessibility of such cognitions. 
These patterns in clinician and client language may be reflective of the limited extent to which 
clinicians utilise MI's techniques of eliciting ambivalence and creating conflict, as measured by 
the UKATT process rating scale (UKATf, 2008). 
The extent to which clinicians focus upon eliciting cognitions supporting status quo, 
and subsequently, eliciting ambivalence associated with changing target behaviour continues tn 
be debated (Rose, 2008; Amrhein et al., 2003). Ambivalence research indicating the higher the 
ambivalent state, the less stable and more pliable attitudes are (Connor & Armitage. in press). 
and cognitive dissonance research, concluding the more intense the magnitude of inconsistent-
related discomfort the greater the motivational drive to achieve cognitive consistency (Festinger. 
1957), suggests clinicians should ensure cognitions associated with changing and not changing 
behaviour are elicited. 
A further area of social psychology literature with potential to advance understanding 
of what makes MI effective is decision-making (Ryder, 1999). Janis and Mann (1977) 
distinguish between hypo vigilant and vigilant decision-making. The latter is associated with 
behavioural outcomes which are maintained. Vigilant decision making entails a thorough 
consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of the range of options available. This is 
consistent with the idea behind MI of weighing pros and cons and exploring ambivalence. It 
may indicate that strength of commitment language and behavioural outcomes would be more 
positive if a thorough consideration of all options were considered. 
Does Ambivalence or Cognitive Dissonance More Adequately Capture the Processes 
Reflected in Client Language? 
Consideration of this research question in the results section led to the conclusion that 
cognitive dissonance more adequately captures the processes reflected in client language. This 
conclusion was reached for two reasons: a) cognitive dissonance is a broad theory encapsulating 
a wide range of inconsistent cognitions (Festinger, 1957). Inconsistent attitudes associated with 
changing the target behaviour captured in ambivalence theory (Connor & Armitage, in press) 
can also be considered under dissonance theory; and b) cognitive dissonance is reflected in 
client language more than twice as often as those captured under ambivalence. 
It is evident that cognitive dissonance theory has a lot to offer clinicians and researcher" 
delivering and developing MI. The idea that client language analysed within a cognitive 
dissonance framework provides useful insight into the motivational processes occurring in MI is 
also supported. It is important not to minimise the importance of the ambivalence construct and 
experience within sessions of MI, however. The primary goal of MI is to elicit and resolve a 
person's ambivalence associated with changing a target behaviour (Miller & Rollnick. 2(02). 
Although cognitive dissonance theory captures this process. the use of ambivalence enables the 
description of a more specific discrepancy-related experience within MI. providing guidance for 
clinicians eliciting and researchers investigating this particular process. 
Strengths and Limitations 
This study has many methodological strengths and weaknesses. Consideration of its 
merits and limitations are discussed within the context of the study's design and sampling 
procedure. 
Study Design 
Interaction between therapist and client predominantly occurs through the medium of 
language. Russell (1989) highlights the key role language plays in the delivery and potential 
effectiveness of "talking therapy", strongly advocating the examination of language as a method 
for investigating therapeutic processes. A potential limitation of the investigation of language 
in any context is the inability to conclude that propositions represent truth or fact, unless their 
content can be scientifically and objectively verified or falsified (Russell, 1989). The semantic 
and latent levels of analysis of client's language in this study, underpinned by social psychology 
theory, cannot be assumed to be a true reflection of the ambivalence and cognitive dissonance 
experience within the client. It is recognised, however, that what is important about language is 
its function. It allows individuals to express and perform, communicate their inner world. 
constitute public space whereby communication can occur between individuals and help people 
get in touch with their human concerns. Reference and truth become secondary. Analysis of 
language as a process research methodology enables examination of client and therapist 
dialogue and the communication between them. which can be grounded in relevant theory. 
Thematic analysis was the chosen qualitative methodology for this project due to its 
flexibility in approach, and ability to be adapted to meet the needs of the research question. The 
deductive method of analysis utilised in this study meant that the examination of data was 
firmly grounded in the theories underpinning the research questions: cognitive dissonance and 
ambivalence. Patterns in the data not associated with such theories were also identified using a 
more data driven approach. A more thorough inductive analysis may have enabled the 
identification of other change processes evident in client language, however. 
Braun and Clarke (2006) outline various disadvantages of thematic analyses as a 
qualitative approach. Unlike other qualitative approaches such as narrative analysis (Murray. 
2003), thematic analysis does not enable a sense of continuity and contradiction to anyone 
individual account obtained. The contradictions and consistencies with the data set in this study 
were not outlined. The researcher was also unable to make claims about language use and 
functionality of talk, which could be obtained if alternative qualitative methods. such a." 
discourse analysis (Burman and Parker, 1993) and conversational analysis (Hutchby and 
Wooffitt, 1998) were utilised. Braun and Clarke argue that a rigorous thematic approach 
produces an insightful analysis as long as a method is chosen which relates to the research 
questions. 
The researcher attempted to conduct a well designed thematic analysis as guided by 
Braun and Clarke (2006) and Boyatis (1998); weaknesses in the investigation are identified. 
however. Although the researcher frequently checked the data extracts with the entire data ,,~t. 
a more thorough test-retest analysis was not completed. Due to the complexity of the 
theoretical knowledge required prior to conducting the investigation and the time limits of the 
study, inter-rater reliability was not obtained. Methods were taken to increase the reliability and 
validity of the findings. Prior to analysis the researcher gained an in-depth understanding of the 
theories underpinning the study and attempted to ensure that the analysis was thorough but not 
over zealous. Consideration was given to how the researcher's mood and style influenced the 
study's completion. Attempts were made to minimise the negative impact of the researcher'" 
personal characteristics on data analysis. It is recognised that the researcher's personal 
experiences may have, at times, impacted on the quality of the study. 
Two additional limitations are identified: the strength of client language is not measured 
and non verbal communication is not coded. Amrhein et al., (2003) found the strength of 
commitment language rather than its frequency of occurrence to predict behavioural outcome. 
As the strength of inconsistent cognitions, or what may be considered within the context of 
cognitive dissonance as the importance, presumably influences the magnitude of inconsistent-
related discomfort (Festinger, 1957), it would be expected that information regarding the 
strength of inconsistent cognitions would provide a deeper insight into the expression of 
ambivalence and cognitive dissonance in MI. In addition to coding the strength of client 
language the MISC 2.1 (Miller et al., 2008) emphasises the importance of taking into 
consideration a client's non verbal behaviours when analysing client language. Non-verbal 
behaviour such as, tone, inclination, facial expressions and gestures have been recognised for 
their ability to enhance understanding of psychotherapeutic processes (Wiener, Budney. Wood. 
& Russell, 1989). Consideration of client non-verbal behaviours in this study could have 
enabled insight into how such communication relates to impact the interpretation of ambivalent 
cognitive dissonant experiences. 
Sample 
The UKATT study (UKATT, 2005) from which the transcripts used in the secondary 
analysis were taken focused upon the delivery of a variation of MI termed MET to individuab 
experiencing alcohol problems. The findings cannot be assumed to be generalisable to the 
treatment of other behaviouraillife-style problems, or to the delivery of a more pure form of \11 
which does not include feedback. As discussed in the methodology section the fir"t of three 
MET sessions where chosen for analysis due to the expectation that more example" of 
discrepancy-related processes will be reflected in client language. It would be interc"ting to 
. f .. d' d l1bl' \'alence would di ffer inform ascertain whether the expreSSIOn 0 cogmtIve Issonance an aI 
and prevalence in the second and third MET sessions. 
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Treatment integrity, as measured by the UKATT process rating scale (l'KATT. 20(8). 
varied. A sampling procedure, whereby treatment integrity was high. would have enabled 
firmer conclusions regarding whether language expressed was due to specific a t t' \lET 
spec" o. . 
A comparative analysis investigating the effect of either treatment integrity (high or low) or 
outcome (good or poor), would also have been of interest. 
Evidence from the social psychology literature, suggesting individual characteristic". 
such as cultural background (Heine & Lehman, 1997) influence the experience of incon"istent-
related discomfort, indicates results may have varied if individuals from a non-Caucasian 
heritage were included in this study. 
Clinical Implications 
The clinical implications of the studies findings are outlined: 
• In addition to considering the elicitation and resolution of a person's ambi valence 
towards changing a target behaviour and the discrepancy between their actual and ideal. 
researchers and clinicians should integrate cognitive dissonance theory into MI research 
and practice. 
• The aim of clinicians delivering MI should be to use its style, principles and technique" 
to increase client's simultaneous accessibility of various forms of inconsistent 
cognitions associated with target behaviour. 
• When eliciting a person's ambivalence towards changing their target behaviour 
clinicians should focus upon increasing client's awareness of the affective and cognitivc 
components of their attitude and, subsequently, cognitive-affective ambivalence. The 
weight of the negative feelings associated with a target behaviour should be amplified, 
increasing the probability of behaviour change. The cognitive and affective content of 
clinician's language appears to be an important factor in the elicitation of different 
components of attitudes. If affective language, such as, "what worries you about your 
drinking?" are utilised on more occasions, it would be more likely that the positive and 
negative affects associated with carrying out target behaviour would be brought into 
client's awareness. 
• As proposed by Miller and Rollnick (2002), the development of a discrepancy between 
a person' s present state of affairs and their broader goal s and values appears to be an 
important motivational process within MI. Eliciting the expression of such 
inconsistencies in close proximity to one another appears to be important. not only in 
magnifying discrepancies between the actual and ideal, but producing a condition 
whereby dissonance is induced. The presence of a dissonance state within the client 
increases the probability that an attempt to achieve consistency will be made. which can 
be manipulated by the clinician to support behaviour changc. 
• 
• 
Evidence of cognitive dissonance in client language highlights the importance of 
increasing the availability and awareness of the impact that a client's target behaviour 
has on their self integrity and self discrepancies, Discussions surrounding how the 
importance of the sel f influences discrepancies between the person one is and the 
person they would like to be may also help improve the processes and effecti \~n~s" of 
MI. 
When providing feedback in MI sessions clinicians should make note of client 
responses and react appropriately. When client's responses are illustrative of shock, 
surprise or negative affect they should be recognised and particular attention paid to 
language reflective of attempts to reduce inconsistent-related discomfort in the direction 
away from change. Draycott and Dabbs (1998) illustrate how Mrs principles can be 
used to reinforce attempts made by the client to reduce their cognitive dissonance in the 
direction of change, and respond to attempts made to reduce dissonance in the direction 
away from change. 
Future Research Questions 
MI is proposed to work through eliciting and resolving discrepancy-related processe", 
increasing commitment language and resulting in behaviour change (Miller & Rollnick, 20(2). 
Research has supported the positive relationship between change talk, commitment talk and 
behaviour change (Amrhein et al., 2003). The relationship between discrepancy-related 
processes and these other stages of change have not been investigated. Examination of the 
relationship between client language illustrative of ambivalence and cognitive dissonance, 
commitment language and behavioural outcomes should be investigated. Such research could 
further substantiate the hypothesis that discrepancy-related processes are key active ingredients 
in MI. Research investigating the relationship between treatment integrity and the expression of 
discrepancy-related processes in MI is also required. The relationship, or more specifically, the 
sequential relationship, between individual techniques and principles of MI. as reflected in 
clinician language and the expression of ambivalence and cognitive dissonance in client 
language would also be insightful. 
Research is required which reliably distinguishes between the affective and cogniti \(' 
content associated with a target behaviour. Investigation of the relationship between the 
affective content of client language, particularly that which supports status quo. with the 
frequency and strength of commitment language and behavioural outcome is required. Such 
research could help confirm or deny conclusions in the social psychology literature that the 
affective component of attitudes, within the context of cognitive affective ambivalence, 
overrides thoughts in determining overall attitudes and behaviours and the occurrence of \ariou" 
forms of ambivalence in MI. 
qq 
McNally et ai., (2006) asked participants attending MI to objectively rate their cognitive 
dissonance experience and discrepancy between their actual and ideal A sl'nu'lar' . . . 
. Ime"Ut:atlOn . 
also including subjective ambivalence measures, asking a range of participants receiving \U in a 
clinical setting, rather than undergraduate students would provide a more quantitative approach 
to expanding understanding of MI discrepancy-related processes. A comparison of quantitative 
analyses, asking participants to subjectively name their discrepancy-related experiences. and 
qualitative analyses investigating patterns in client language would be beneficial. 
Summary and Conclusions 
Consideration of the shared and distinct attributes of ambivalence and cognitive 
dissonance theories within the context of MI illustrate how both these discrepancy-related 
concepts expand current understanding of the motivational processes occurring in MI. 
Application of the moti vational process model outlined in chapter 2 to transcri pts of MI. 
demonstrates a range of ways ambivalence and cognitive dissonance are expressed in client 
language. Various forms of inconsistent cognitions inherent in both theories occurring in close 
proximity to one another infer an experience of inconsistent-related discomfort within the client. 
A theoretical analysis of the application of cognitive dissonance to the processes of MI and the 
theory-led examination of client language indicate that cognitive dissonance. in addition to 
ambivalence, has much to offer in understanding how motivation is influenced during MI. On 
the basis of the evidence presented here, Miller and Rollnick's (2002) rejection of the 
occurrence of cognitive dissonance in MI is questionable. Language reflecting attempts to 
reduce inconsistent-related discomfort also provides evidence contradicting Miller & Rollnick's 
rationale for dismissing cognitive dissonance; to avoid a motivational drive to achieve cognitive 
consistency. 
Consideration of the breadth of cognitive dissonance theory, in addition to the extent to 
which it is prevalent in client language, illustrates that in addition to ambi valence, cognitive 
dissonance has much to offer current understanding of the motivational processes of Ml. 
Analysis of client language as a method for investigating MI's active ingredients provides 
information regarding patterns in client language which clinicians can make note of. understand 
within the context of ambivalence and cognitive dissonance theory, and respond to 
appropriately. This study highlights the importance of narrowing the gap between the fields of 
motivational interviewing and social psychology and suggests that this may be mutually 
beneficial. 
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Appendix 2: Permission Letter from the Principal Investigators of the lTKA T Trial 
To whom it may concern 
This is to confirm that the Principal Investigators of the UK Alcohol Treatment Trial gi w 
consent for Krissy Abercrombie to have access to video recordings of treatment sessions from 
the trial for the purpose of developing and testing a new rating method, and that this is in line 
with the consent obtained from clients during the study. 
The Principal Investigators also give consent for her to have access to treatment process rating 
and outcome data from the trial. 
Gillian Tober 
Principal Investigator 
UK Alcohol Treatment Trial 
Honorary Consultant in Addiction Psychology 
Leeds Mental Health NHS Teaching Trust 
12/01/2007 
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Appendix 3: UKATT Participant Consent Form 
I agree to take part in the research comparing two forms of help for stopping or reducino 
drinking. e 
The research has been explained to me. I understand that I will be offered one of two forms of 
help and that I will be required to complete some further questionnaires during the therapy and 
to attend follow-up appointments. I also understand that, with my consent, someone (or more 
than one) who knows me well may be invol ved in meetings with the therapist. 
I understand that any personal information I give in this research project \\ill be kept strictly 
confidential. I understand that this information will be used only in combination with 
information from many other people so that I cannot be identified. 
I understand that, with my consent, the member of my family or other person who knows me 
well whom I have suggested, may be contacted for further information of my progress after the 
end ofthe therapy. I understand that any information from this other individual will be kept 
strictly confidential. I also understand that any other contact names and addresses I have 
supplied will be used purely for establishing my whereabouts during the follow-up period and 
my involvement in this trial will not be revealed to them. 
I agree to video recordings of my sessions being used for quality control and teaching purposes. 
and for future research. I understand that I will not be seen in the video but my voice will be 
heard on the recording. I understand that by putting a cross in the appropriate box below these 
tapes will be destroyed at the end of the trial. 
I know that I can ask questions about the research now or at any stage, and that I can choose to 
withdraw from the research at any time without this affecting the quality of help I receive. 
I have been given a list of the names and telephone numbers of those responsible for this 
research, including the name of a manager to whom I should address any complaint or grievance 
that I might have. 
I require that all video recordings of my sessions be destroyed at the end of the trial 0 
Name Assessors Name ................................ · .. ··· .................................................. 
Signature ............................................ Signature ................................ ················· 
Date ....................................................... . 
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Appendix 4: Ethics COmmittee Approval 
Chairman: Professor Alan C Roberts 
. . OBE TO DL MPhii PhD DSc LLD FLS CBiol FIBiol 
Administrator: Sue Bell 
Top Floor 
Extension Block 
St Lukes Hospital 
Little Horton Lane 
Bradford 
BD5 ONA 
Tel: 01274365508 
Fax: 01274365509 
Email: sue.bell@bradfordhospitals.nhs.uk 
Email: alan.roberts@bradfordhositals.nhs.uk 
13 March 2007 
Miss Kristine Abercrombie 
Psychologist in Clinical Training 
Programmes in clinical psychology 
Academic unit of psychiatry and behavioural sciences 
15 Hyde Terrace 
Leeds 
LS29LT 
Dear Miss Abercrombie 
Full title of study: The expression of ambivalence in Motivational Interviewing: an 
exploratory study 
REC reference number: 07/Q1202l1 0 
Thank you for your letter of 05 March 2007, responding to the Committee's request for further 
information on the above research and submitting revised documentation. 
The further information has been considered on behalf of the Committee by the Chair. 
Confirmation of ethical opinion 
On behalf of the Committee, I am pleased to confirm a favourable ethical opinion for the above 
research on the basis described in the application form, protocol and supporting documentation. 
Ethical review of research sites 
The Committee has not yet been notified of the outcome of any site-specific assessment (SSA) 
for the research site(s) taking part in this study. The favourable opinion does not therefore apply 
to any site at present. We will write to you again as soon as one Research Ethics Committee 
has notified the outcome of a SSA. In the meantime no study procedures should be initiated at 
sites requiring SSA. 
Conditions of approval 
The favourable opinion is given provided that you comply with the conditions set out in the 
attached document. You are advised to study the conditions carefully. 
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The final list of documents reviewed and approved by the Committee is as follows: 
Document Version Date 
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Investigator CV 
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Letter from Sponsor 23 January 2007 
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R&D approval 
The study should not commence at any NHS site until the local Principal Investigator has 
obtained final approval from the R&D office for the relevant NHS care organisation. 
Statement of compliance 
The Committee is constituted in accordance with the Governance Arrangements for Research 
Ethics Committees (July 2001) and complies fully with the Standard Operating Procedures for 
Research Ethics Committees in the UK. 
07/Q1202/10 Please quote this number on all correspondence 
With the Committee's best wishes for the success of this project 
Yours sincerely 
Professor A Roberts 
Chai rman - Bradford Research Ethics Committee 
Enclosures: 
Copy to: 
Standard approval conditions 
Site approval form 
Miss Claire Skinner 
U ni versi ty of Leeds 
Faculty Grants Officer - Research Degrees Office 
7.11 Worsley Building 
University of Leeds 
LS29JT 
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Consortium 
Miss K Abercrombie 
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University of Leeds 
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Dear Miss Abercrombie, 
West Yorkshire Mental Health R&D 
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E-mail: John.hiley@ leedsmh.nhs UK 
Direct Line: 0113 295 2387 
FAX: 01132952412 
RE: The expression of ambivalence in motivational interviewing for alcohol 
misuse: an exploratory study 
I am pleased to inform you that the above project has been approved by the relevant 
Consortium panel and we now have all the relevant documentation relating to the above 
research. As such your project may now begin within the Trust. 
This approval is granted subject to the following conditions: 
• You must comply with the terms of your ethical approval. Failure to do this will lead 
to permission to carry out this project being withdrawn. If you make any 
substantive changes to your protocol you must inform the relevant ethics 
committee and us immediately, 
• You must comply with the Consortium's policy on project monitoring and audit. 
• You must comply with the guidelines laid out in the Research Governance 
Framework for Health and Social Care1, Failure to do this could lead to 
permission to carry out this research being withdrawn. 
• You must comply with any other relevant guidelines including the Data Protection 
Act, The Health and Safety Act and local Trust Policies and Guidelines. 
• You must adhere to the Trust's Counter Fraud policies, If you suspect that 
research misconduct or fraud is taking place you must report this immediately 
following the instructions provided in the enclosed Counter Fraud leaflet. 
lIS 
• 
• 
If you encounter any problems during your research you must inform your 
supervisor and us immediately for advice/assistance. 
Research projects will be added to the National Research Register. 
Once you have finished your research you will be required to complete a Project Outcome 
form. This will be sent to you nearer the end date of your project (Please inform us if the 
expected end date of your project changes for any reason). 
We will require a copy of your final report/peer reviewed papers or any other publications 
relating to this research. Finally we may also request that you provide us with written 
information relating to your work for dissemination to a variety of audiences including 
service users and carers, members of staff and members of the general public. You must 
provide this information on request 
If you have any queries during your research please contact us at any time 
Yours sincerely 
John Hiley 
Research Governance & Programme Manager 
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Appendix 6: Candidate Thematic Map Outlining Ambivalence Themes and Sub-themes 
Language expressing 
an inability to make a 
decision 
Expression of affect 
associated with the 
consequences of carrying 
out or not carrying out the 
hehaviollr 
Clear Expressions 
reflecting an awareness of 
being an ambivalent state 
The presence of 
inconsistent cognitions 
within a few coinciding 
Response agreeing 
with a double sided 
reflection with the 
Statements of Direct 
Ambivalence 
Cognitive affective 
Ambivalence 
Affect 
client utterances therapist 
Response to therapist 
lan~ua~e usin o words of 
'- '- ~ 
affect 
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Appendix 7: Candidate Thematic Outlining Cognitive Dissonance Themes and Sub-themes 
Threat to self integrity 
Expression of 
dislike/disappointment 
towards self due to target 
behaviour 
Inconsistencies in self 
Discrepancies between 
who thev are ·when 
thev are and are not 
Indication that feedhack is 
adding new cognition~. Negative 
react ion to this informat ion: 
hclicf di"confirm;11 inn 
drinking 
Discussion of past use 
of distraction 
techniques 
~ 
Reducing cognitive 
dissonance in the 
direction of change 
Externalising the 
<-
Minimisation/ 
justification 
trivial isat ion of 
responsihilityof 
change 
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Appendix 8: Example of Coded Data Extract 
Transcript 1: 
T: Okay, jed. You have gave me a lot of information there reall y, and I'll just quickl y reall y some of 
that back. Some of the good things you said you enjoyed about your drinking was that it helped) ou 
with your mood. You were able to adjust your mood to how you felt. It brightened you up. On the 
other hand you realised if you had too much to drink it brought out an unpleasant side of you. 
Which you yourself were not happy with because of the way it made you lose you temper. You'd 
start to argue. Alison and yourself recognised another side you were not happy with. So although 
the alcohol helped you at first to brighten you up, it could very easily move to the other side and 
you'd find that it wouldn't actually help. 
4:Mfoe...-CAJUCE D~ L~ 'S.'EL'f-
C: That's what I said, like Jekyll and hyde. 
T: Yeah, so its actually made you like and Jekyll and hyde. You have like 2 different personalities 
or which one is it gonna be. 
0: (inaudible). There is a time when you can sit down and you can talk to him and you can say. 
T: yea 
0: the other day when I caught him in the pub. I don't know which side it's going to be. Is it this 
side, or that side? 
T: So its difficult for you to know were you stand really. If you are having someone where it is not 
very clear sometimes them selves. On the one hand you might think (Implausible). You very clearly 
said that you think you know if you had another binge, what will happen to you. I thin k really the 
fact that you had the one drink, shows you, you just had that one drink. Even that really shows you. 
you spent the next four days in bed. 
l\f ~ . CorJ~tQu~..x.E- o~- rpe\.~L ~r-.x; 
C: With a bucket next to me throwing up. 
T: With you one drink, one drink would never had been enough for you. 
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. W~A7ll/e- U--:.Y~ECu.A.-€--JCE- C)F D.2..h.~Ctf'':~ 
C: No certamly not. But the pancreas is that bad now the alcohol. .. initially I was headino for 
11 d d · ki ..-.-- J e contro e nn ng. J.--N\l.lt\:- PfSli(~E-/qO~L 
T; Ok, so yea. 
c; 0 ~ L-- "\ A-lCl.J( <; L:G{)S g.{;~E C \.-~~I~' C 
C: That was my aim wasn't it. Em, last year I started having 4 cans a day. At night not drinking 
during the day. I'd just sit if the evening watching tv. 
C: Had a couple more, i'd have had the car outside with me. 
0: I'd had a go at you. 
C: if she hadn't come in. She'd stopped me ofre starting that process up again. 
T: so you'd ... 
lI\CCIV':; \ ~\ (~\ 
Fe£" \ yV~ S. 
'V(SI e~ Lv C~ f yt..E:;Ll"-'L, t\ c; ';' ~IZ..I ,~ ( I rJ( 
C: I have to find a way of stopping that process. That process of giving into craving. Last night I 
. \'-JCc, ~ t=((;LI _'f f-.\,sr; t)~lN(~I\.I( 
said to her, you'll have to come up woth us. I'm just tea~ful all the time. ) 
T: Yeah and that's your emotions. They will be up and down, becasure you know really what you 
are saying is you tried to control drinking and you had that in mind when you stopped last year. And 
you were, you stopped. However you realized even that wasn't working cos you went from -+ to 8 
(<<~'C~ 'vt:- -A~€c-r1-V E .P\{'I\ClvACCt--l((-
A 
and at the moment you have stopped drinking. Where do you think that leaves you now? What have 
-:.-rv.Al- \L I. ~. 
you decided. '0,5. p.c: 
,r ~ :p(sl~ e- to ~~ E? fY\f\C1.t-.::nP.lf.:O ~QlvA LJ~Cf: 
A. Iv \C: I've decided I don't want to drink at all but my body and my mind are telling me different thing .... ~ \ . pr r '''-'L' 
?'7 '" ;.> \, I mean em. Last night, it's daft. It's a daft thing this situation. Its go~~ ~o~~dd~ft t~ \ou. It: ... j~s\ ~' ~ 
D \.. \ i G ..)v\..\(. ,0' laugh anyway. She went on holiday, somewhere and bought me this homemade bottle of beer thing 
o " r 
A ~·I I with a funny name on it. And I keep it in my flat as an ornament. It's fulL it's real beer. It ... its on the 
~/ tPfl\; D(SI((E- 10 .J::'WIC I iAICL-J( ~7t.(,:\-CI-¥\~)E-
. V\ l"fireplace and last mght I was tfiat close to dnnking It. ~~ 'v' ~~\~j~ 
~ 0: It's never bothered you before. 
C: It's never bothered me before. But this time and then, its just, it's beer. All I know j ... that' ... there. 
its alcohol in that bottle. 
NE~... FC~LI w~ IV:'). \,v L-r~ ALwri~L 
C: Whether I, I ~on't like beer. I don't like bitter. I don't like mild like Guinness l"k t h \\', pESt (i_flo D(tll\J Ie '. 1 e sco c. ..1.., 
that tempted fast night I was walking up and down the flat for about an hour and a half. I \\~b saying 
to her, I last spoke to her. We say goodnight about 10 half 10 at night, and I was pacing up and 
down for a good hour and half. And that was even taking me (implausible) picked up and 
everything. I was still so, I've really got a fight going on inside me at the moment. 
T: So you're finding it difficult. 
Iv f-4 K. € L 0-1) M'). 'P C. L'-') \ L V~\ 
C: I'm frightened of losing it. 
T: You know what you're saying is that you've stopped drinking and you're saying you know you 
need to stop drinking. 
10 E--~ _ (,0 r.J ~. -- oj.- 'De.w Ie. l ~)' 
C: If I don't I'll end up dead. 
T: So you're saying if you don't stop drinking you'll end up dead, that's what you're saying to me 
and you're recognizing that. However as much as you know that and you have to do that you're 
finding it difficult. ...--"e~(.V0') D\.~~ L,~' -r .... \P Djfl~{·c..--riC(~~' f'\\.r.Jf~ 
Le>1P<J 5!fLf- rFFiLAC~1 ~Rc""- cn~l:: 
C: this time I'm finding it really, really difficult, and I don't know why. I mean normally Alison, it-.. 
been really bad and I'd say to ~er that's it and I'll stay dry and then something, I don't know \vhy. 
, /\/ A ll.-L) it) L Ll -r 'i () 1,.- ca; 
Something will pop up and its not problems, I've got no problems. 
T: So really even though you're more determined to make sure you don't drink.. , 
pCs lL'(---r,," L.7- 'i.\,--"::'..:f- . IY\ '\\<H \~\C-o. I>tf'rtblJI\L~~ .. JLC 
C: Somehow, if you could take the sectIOn of my bram away Which l~ saYl~g. come on l~d take a . 
r,s \. II \I f ~ ~ E.. L.I..-..;,,~ .Ao.sS ~.' \" \-{, 0 i2.. "--', Ie ,( ---.j(. 
drink it will do you the world of good, have a laugh. If you could Just take that out. Cos If I d Just 
tl U AL . 
go out for say Sunday lunch and a Saturday, Tuesday night. 
(Interruption) 
<' 0C .~~~N.J() c. ~J( c; - Ctv\r0~ ~,.,J\ -rf.-~~ lZ- k-'Pu..c v0 ~ P l ..)..> jVl<ll, G. ' 
C: It's just stopping that but you know, and I'd find myself looking to see can I replace that With 
something. But I'm going down the wrong road thinking that \\'ay. I know that for a fact. 
12~ 
